1 The East Asian Miracle at the Millennium 2 Growth, Crisis, and the Future of Economic Recovery in East Asia 3 Technological Change and Growth in East Asia:Macro versus Micro Perspectives 4 Chinese Rural Industrialization in the Context of the East Asian Miracle 5 After the Crisis, the East Asian Dollar Standard Resurrected:An Interpretation of High-Frequency Exchange Rate Pegging 6 Industrial and Financial Policy in China and Vietnam:A New Model or a Replay of the East Asian Experience? 7 Government Control in Corporate Governance as a Transitional Institution: Lessons from China 8 The Government-Firm Relationship in Postwar Japan:The Success and Failure of Bureau Pluralism 9 Miracle as Prologue: The State and the Reform of the Corporate Sector in Korea 10 Trade and Growth: Import-Led or Export-Led? Evidence from Japan and Korea 11 Emergence of an FDI-Trade Nexus and Economic Growth in East Asia 12 Rethinking the Role of Government Policy in Southeast Asia 13 From Miracle to Crisis to Recovery:Lessons from Four Decades of East Asian Experience
【2015新书】Education as Cultivation in Chinese Culture https://bbs.pinggu.org/thread-3595868-1-1.html 声明： 本资源仅供学术研究参考之用，发布者不负任何法律责任，敬请下载者支持购买正版。 提倡免费分享！ 我发全部免费的，分文不收 来看看 ... 你也可关注我 https://bbs.pinggu.org/z_guanzhu.php?action=listattentionfuid=3727866
Nope, it's just another series of air dramas involving disruptive Chinese air travelers. It hasn't been the most peaceful fortnight in the aviation industry -- we've seen the aftermath of a Korean Air exec's "nut rage" and RB singer Jeremih arrested for attempting to force open a closed airplane door after missing the last call for boarding. In the midst of this unruly behavior have come no fewer than four inflight dramas involving Chinese tourists. On the heels of a "Gimme my cup noodle water!" meltdown and two emergency exit incidents, a bizarre fight between multiple passengers broke out over a dispute involving a crying baby. The poor kid probably just couldn't get any sleep with all the fuss going on. READ: Korean Air executive resigns over nuts on a plate row Hot water throw dow n The fortnight of infamy was highlighted by the cup noodle row heard 'round the world -- or at least across Asia. On December 11, four tourists threw a series of tantrums on an Air Asia flight from Bangkok to Nanjing. The episode began during takeoff when, observing safety rules, cabin staff refused to serve hot water to a couple who wanted to immediately get going on their cup noodle. The couple retaliated by crushing nuts on the floor. The man, Wang, was allegedly still fuming when a flight attendant for the budget airline brought him a cup of hot water after the plane reached cruising altitude, then attempted to charge him 60 Thai baht ($2) for the water. "You think I can't afford it?" Wang demanded, using the word "laozi," a pompous way of referring to one's self as a boss or superior. A video captured Wang yelling at the attendant. As the quarrel dragged on, the man's girlfriend, Zhang, threw hot water on the back of the flight attendant. Thai authorities eventually ordered Zhang to pay 50,000 baht ($1,500) to the flight attendant. Each passenger involved in the incident was fined amounts between $3 and $6. Chinese government not amused The China National Tourism Administration issued a stern statement after the Air Asia episode, saying it had "severely damaged the overall image of Chinese people" and demanding local authorities review the case. Air rage is a common sight in delay-prone China. In recent years, state media has reported numerous dramatic incidents involving irate passengers, ranging from blocking moving aircraft on an active runway to fistfights with airport employees. During an official visit to the Maldives in September, President Xi Jinping personally asked Chinese tourists to behave themselves while traveling abroad. Last year the government released a lengthy list of do's and don'ts aimed at turning Chinese travelers into "civilized tourists." All the warnings and cajoling seem to have fallen on deaf ears, though. MORE: Flight diverted after passenger reportedly throws hot water at crew member Quickest way off a plane? Emergency exit! Impatient or lacking fresh air or ... something ... Chinese passengers in separate incidents in the past two weeks decided to deal with their "stuck on a plane" dilemmas in unexpected fashion. Upon landing in Sanya on December 8 after a China Eastern flight from Xi'an, a fidgety passenger not content to suffer through the excruciating disembarkation process -- Don't judge! We've all been there! -- went ahead and opened the emergency exit door, engaging the aircraft's inflatable slide. Xinhua news agency said the reason for the man's action was unknown, but The Nanfang website from southern China reported that the passenger said he simply wanted to depart the plane sooner. His solution, to borrow loosely from Jane Austen, did display a certain amount of sense, if not sensibility. Regardless, the shortcut cost the airline $16,000 and a two-hour delay, according to Xinhua. That unauthorized exit was followed by an incident on December 14 during which a first-time flier on a Xiamen Air flight reportedly felt the urge for some fresh air while waiting for his plane to take off. His fix? Open the emergency door for better ventilation. The man wasn't fined or punished because the act didn't cause any damage, stated the airline . READ: Worst celeb in-flight meltdowns Baby mama drama Calm in the skies reigned for three entire days before being shattered on Thursday when a minor brawl broke out on an Air China flight from Chongqing to Hong Kong. The imbroglio began when a pair of passengers complained about the crying baby seated behind them. The child's mother, meanwhile, spared no words in expressing her own displeasure with the people in front reclining their seats into her space. Unable to compromise, the quarrel escalated into a full-on fight. A photo in which one woman appears ready to slap another woman -- who herself seems to be floating almost perpendicular to the floor of the aircraft, perhaps readying to deliver an unorthodox blow of her own -- quickly circulated online. "A group brawl above 7,500 meters. Our plane was almost turned around," wrote a passenger who shared the incident and picture on Weibo, China's Twitter. The plane wasn't diverted, though Hong Kong police were called in to keep everyone calm and carrying on once the plane landed. Meanwhile, no air rage incidents have been reported for 24 hours ... and counting ...
Hong Kong (CNN) -- China's online marketplace Taobao is offering buyers the chance to look like a world leader -- for less than $30. Shops on the site are selling imitations of the so-called "New Chinese Suits" worn by U.S. President Barack Obama and other leaders at this week's APEC banquet dinner in Beijing. The traditional-style Chinese button down shirts that have a modern high collar are selling for as little as $27, with the more high-end ones going for nearly $800. And it's not all about the male leaders -- the longer Chinese button down jackets and traditional long dresses emblazoned with floral embroidery worn by female leaders and the spouses of their male counterparts are also for sale.
Hands-On Data Science with R Dr Graham Williams, PhD (ANU, Machine Learning), BSc (Maths, Hons) Chief Data Scientist, Togaware and Australian Taxation Office Adjunct Professor, Australian National University and University of Canberra International Visiting Professor, Chinese Academy of Sciences Our goal is to provide introductory material to cost effectively kick start an organization's entry into Data Science. To that end, we introduce the use of R for doing Data Science. In addition to the extensive material available on our web site we provide a unique offering of in-situ hands-on training . We offer traditional out-of-office training courses, but we find more effective learning can occur hands-on in-situ. We offer one of the world's leading Data Scientists to work alongside and mentor your staff over one or two weeks. We work confidentially on actual projects, with training "on-the-job" provided by a professional with 30 years experience in the industry and author of the best selling book on Data Mining with Rattle and R . Contact Togaware Training at training@togaware.com for details. Our on-line resources, including Hands-On Data Science , weave together a collection of freely available and open source tools for the Data Scientist. The tools are all part of the R Statistical Software Suite. Each chapter is made up of multiple pages, but each page within a chapter is a one page guide that covers a particular aspect of the topic (hence also refered to as the OnePageR guide). They are a great place to start, before engaging our hands-on training experts. Hands-On Data Science can be worked through as a hands-on guide and then used as a reference guide. Each page aims to be a bite sized chunk for hands-on learning, building on what has gone before. Many chapters also have a lecture pack and a laboratory session where a number of tasks can be completed. The R code sitting behind each chapter is also provided and can be easily run standalone to replicate the material presented in the chapter. The material is always under development ! Chapters will change (and hopefully improve) regularly. Links preceded with a * are more well developed. All of the material is provided under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License allowing access to everyone for any purpose (except commercial) and is provided at no cost. You can assist in helping cover the costs of providing this material through a $40 contribution using PayPal. Your support encourages further development of this resource as does feedback, suggestions, and ideas , which are always welcome. Refer to the Data Mining Survival Guide or my book on Data Mining with Rattle and R: The Art of Excavating Data for Knowledge Discovery (Use R) for related material. Many of the initial chapters were developed and tested whilst visiting the Shenzhen Institutes of Advanced Technology as an International Visiting Professor of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. The data used across the chapters is available for download as data.zip . Enjoy! Getting Started as a Data Scientist An Introduction to Data Mining: * Lecture Introducing Data Science, Rattle and R: * Lecture - * Chapter - * R Rattle to R: * Chapter - * R R for the Eager Data Scientist A Template for Preparing Data: * Chapter - * R A Template for Building Models: * Chapter - * R Case Studies: * Chapter - * R Basic R Tips and Tricks Chapter - R Dealing With Data Reading Data into R: * Chapter - * R Exploring and Summarising Data: * Chapter - * R Visualising Data with GGPlot2: * Chapter - * R Transforming Data: * Chapter - * R Descriptive Analytics Cluster Analysis: * Lecture - Chapter - R Association Analysis: * Lecture - Chapter - R Predictive Analytics Decision Trees: * Lecture - * Chapter - * R - * Rattle Ensembles of Decision Trees: * Lecture - * Chapter - * R Support Vector Machines Neural Networks Naive Bayes: Chapter - R Multivariate Adaptive Regression Splines: Chapter - R Evaluating Models: * Chapter - * R Scoring (R) PMML (R) Exporting Models for Deployment Advanced Analytics Text Mining: * Chapter - * R Social Network Analysis: Chapter -R Genetic Programming: Chapter -R Advanced R Strings: Chapter , R Dates and Time: * Chapter - * R Spatial Data * Chapter - * R Big Data * Chapter - * R Exploring Different Plots: Chapter - R Writing Functions: Chapter - R Parallel Processing: Chapter - R Environments: * Chapter - R Expert R Packaging (R) Pulling it Together into a Package Doing R with Style: * Chapter - * R Literate Data Science with KnitR: * Lecture - * Chapter - * R
(CNN) -- "UglyGorilla," "KandyGoo," and "WinXYHappy" are some of the aliases used by the Chinese accused of hacking U.S. companies on Monday. The men behind these handles are officers of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under a unit known simply by the code 61398. Little is confirmed about the mysterious unit 61398, a section that the Chinese authorities have not officially acknowledged. The Chinese defense ministry said the country's military "has never supported any hacker activities." But the U.S. indictment notice pinpoints a non-descript building on Datong Road in Shanghai's Pudong District as one of the locations for unit 61398's alleged cyber espionage activities. The Shanghai building allegedly home to a part of the PLA's unit 61398. When CNN tried to visit the building last year, our correspondents were chased away by security guards, as seen in the video above. What is unit 61398 and what do they do? U.S.-based Internet security firm Mandiant released a 60-page report last year detailing allegations against the shadowy unit over a six-year period. U.S. vulnerable to Chinese cyberspies? Chinese accused of hacking US secrets Snowden: U.S. hacked targets in China According to Mandiant's document and the U.S. indictment, here's what we know about the secret division. Capable Mandiant says unit 61398 is also known as the "comment crew," and has systematically stolen hundreds of terabytes of data from at least 141 organizations across 20 industries worldwide since as early as 2006. Large Mandiant estimates that more than 1,000 servers are being used by unit 61398. The security firm believes the unit employs anywhere from hundreds to thousands of staff. A look at the physical size of the building in Shanghai -- 12 floors high, with more than 130,000 square feet of space -- suggests the unit could house around 2,000 people. Focused Mandiant observed 141 companies targeted by unit 61398, out of which 115 were in the United States. These were blue-chip companies in important industries such as aerospace, satellite and telecommunications, and information technology -- strategic industries that were identified in China's five year plan for 2011 to 2015. "It's really a who's who of American companies," says Grady Summers, Mandiant's vice president. Some of the alleged victims included in the latest indictment are U.S. Steel Corp., Westinghouse, Alcoa, Allegheny Technologies, the United Steel Workers Union and SolarWorld. Well-supported Unit 61398 was given a special fiber optic communication infrastructure by state-owned enterprise China Telecom in the name of national defense, Mandiant reported. Tricky The accused Chinese hackers reportedly use spear-phishing to hack into companies. The simple trick makes scam emails appear like they are from someone the receiver actually knows. For example, the emails would be personally addressed and signed by another employee in the same company. Spear-phishers may scan social media to find out personal details about a victim to make the scam emails seem legitimate. Tip of the iceberg Unit 61398 is just one of more than 20 cyber attack groups with origins in China, says Mandiant.
Full coverage of CNN international correspondent Nima Elbagir's Chibok journey will screen on CNN International on Saturday 17 May at 2100 CET, Sunday 18 May at 0030 CET, 0400 CET and 1200 CET and Monday 19 May at 0730 CET. (CNN) -- A Cameroonian soldier was killed and 10 Chinese nationals went missing after a Boko Haram attack in northern Cameroon, officials from China, the United States and France said Saturday. No further details were immediately available on the circumstances of their disappearance, said Lu Quinjiang, first counselor of the Chinese Embassy in Yaounde, Cameroon's capital. One Chinese national was injured in Friday night's attack and was being treated by a Chinese medical team in the Chadian capital of N'Djamena, Lu said. French President François Hollande mentioned the incident Saturday while hosting a security summit in Paris about the growing threat from Boko Haram, the Nigeria-based terror group. Witnesses to Terror Later, U.S. Undersecretary of State Wendy Sherman specified Boko Haram as being behind Friday's attack in a region of Cameroon known to be a stronghold for the group. "Cameroon just suffered its own Boko Haram attack at a Chinese company last night," Sherman said, noting also that Boko Haram is to blame for the abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls in Nigeria. Several African and Western nations stepped up their search for the girls under a new plan announced at the security summit. Boko Haram translates as "Western education is a sin" in the Hausa language that's the lingua franca in West and Central Africa. The militant group says its aim is to impose stricter enforcement of Sharia law across Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, which is split between a majority Muslim north and a mostly Christian south. Boko Haram's attacks have intensified in recent years. Cameroon attac k Friday's attack targeted employees of a Chinese company in the northern Cameroonian town of Waza, a few miles away from the Nigerian border. U.S. questions Nigeria's rescue ability; France hosts summit The Chinese embassy is working with Cameroon's government to locate the missing workers, Lu said, and has asked for tighter security to protect Chinese nationals in the northern part of the country. The Chinese company, Sinohydro, is an engineering firm that builds large scale hydropower projects. It has been involved in the construction of the Memve'ele dam in southern Cameroon as part of the country's effort to boost electricity production, according to the company's website. Last year, a group of Boko Haram fighters crossed into northern Cameroon and abducted a French family of four children, their parents and an uncle from Waza National Park. The family was eventually released, reportedly in exchange for a $3 million ransom and the release of 16 Boko Haram prisoners held in Cameroon.
Tracing The Great Chinese Gold Rush Submitted by Tyler Durden on 11/04/2013 22:16 -0500 China in Share 5 As we recently noted, China is taking over the world on gold bar at a time. This growing world super-power has, it would appear (by words and deeds ) grown tired of being on the receiving end of the USDollar and Fed money printing. The Real Asset Company illustrates how, in the space of a few decades, China has opened up her huge gold market which is now hungrily devouring the world's physical gold . (click image for large legible version) Average: 5 Your rating: None Average: 5 ( 6 votes) !-- - advertisements - .AR_2 .ob_empty {display: none;} .AR_2 .rec-link {color: #565656;text-decoration: none;font-size: 12px;} .AR_2 .rec-link:hover {color: #565656;text-decoration: underline;font-size: 12px;} .AR_2 {float: left;width:50%} .AR_2 li {list-style: none outside none !important;font-size: 10px;padding-bottom: 10px;line-height: 13px;margin:0;} .AR_2 .ob_org_header {color: #000000;text-decoration:bold; margin-left: 0px; font-size:14px;line-height:35px;} .AR_3 .rec-link {color: #565656;text-decoration: none;font-size: 12px;} .AR_3 .rec-link:hover {color: #565656;text-decoration: underline;font-size: 12px;} .AR_3 .rec-src-link {font-size: 12px;} .AR_3 li {padding-bottom: 10px;list-style: none outside none !important;font-size: 10px;line-height: 13px;margin:0;} .AR_3 .ob_dual_left, .AR_3 .ob_dual_right {float: left;padding-bottom: 0;padding-left: 2%;padding-top: 0;} .AR_3 .ob_org_header {color: #000000; text-decoration:bold; margin-left: 0px; font-size:14px;line-height:35px;} .AR_3 .ob_ads_header {color: #000000; text-decoration:bold; margin-left: 0px; font-size:14px;line-height:35px;} -- - advertisements - This company is about to destroy Bank of America - Find out the 1 small company that is poised to end the banking model as we know it… Login or register to post comments 8636 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Chinese 'Gold Rush' -Year of Dragon First Week Sees Record Sales– Up 49.7% Guest Post: The 'Mobile' Gold Rush Tracing The History Of China's Forex Reserves And Trade Balance John Taylor: Rushing Toward Smoot-Hawley v.2.0 China Hikes RRR For Fourth Time In 2011: As Real Estate Bubble Pops, JPM Sees "Mass Affluent" Rushing Into Gold
The Chinese Credit Bubble - Full Frontal Submitted by Tyler Durden on 11/05/2012 22:40 -0400 Whereas it is relatively easy to track the progression of the "developed world" deep into the twilight rabbit zone hole (in bizarro metaphore-land speak) of no total debt/GDP return as defined by Reinhart and Rogoff (where anything above 80% sovereign leverage is more or less the game over line for one country, let along the entire Western world) courtesy of day to day updates of total debt in the US (103% debt/GDP) and its comparably indebted peers, when it comes to world's growth dynamo - China - it is next to impossible to get a sense of just how big the debt hole is for a country whose economic data has been and continues to be one massive goalseeked, G.I.G.O. blackbox. At least that is the case at the sovereign level where the government can and does show whatever data it feels like as the country is excluded from traditional counterparty flow checks which serve as an at least modest buffer for data fabrication for the other globalized countries engaging in international trade. That, and the Ministry of Truth of course, which some have likened recently to an amateur version of the US' own BLS. However, while government and consumer debt can be whatever China wants it to be (and when it isn't, any discharged and non-performing debt is merely masked over with more debt: China doesn't have $3 trillion in foreign reserves for nothing) corporate debt, in keeping with Western-style reporting requirements, is far more difficult to obfuscate and falsify in recent years. It is here that we get the first glimpse of the true sheer extent of the Chinese credit bubble, which as the chart below shows, is already the largest in the entire world. None other than Goldman Sachs is concerned by this absolute number, which in recent years has exploded to all time highs: The rapid rise of corporate leverage to 130% of GDP in 2011 - one of the highest corporate leverage ratios in the world - is concerning . This high leverage is the result of substantial investment in the manufacturing sector since 2008, leading to over-capacity in many sectors such as solar energy, steel and ship building . It is therefore critical for the new leadership to pursue reforms that not only support the private sector, but also consumption more broadly, in order to utilize this capacity; the alternative would likely prove negative for sectors, banks, and ultimately, the economy. And here we go back to the one simplest fact of functional leverage that so few grasp: namely that debt, like money, is fungible. And debt, like money, will go to whatever sector has the capacity to carry it: be it corporate, household, financial, or, as a last resort, sovereign, in order to extract every possible ounce of future growth at the expense of current assets and cash flows, until neither viable collateral (as Europe has discovered), nor cash flows (as is becoming ever more apparent in the US) can sustain it. Sadly, it is still virtually impossible to get a comprehensive picture of total Chinese leverage as a function of GDP, the way we can, and have shown for the rest of the world. Recall from " Five Years Since The Great Financial Crisis: "No Growth, No Deleveraging " these two very telling charts: Total debt to GDP broken down by insolvent developed country: And total average and median rebased economy debt: What this shows is that all platitudes of the Richard Koos aside and Paul Krugmans, who demand ever more debt, the developed world is at its debt capacity. So what can we infer about the full big picture in China? We present Chart 2: the historical rise in Chinese corporate (somewhat auditable) and other other (completely imaginary) debt: If one takes the chart above showing the absolute level in Corporate debt, and assumes this is a valid proxy for total leverage growth across all other sectors, one can say, with a straight face, that if all Chinese debt on and off the books, including shadow leverage, were to be pooled, it would make America's grand consolidated debt (excluding the $100 trillion in entitlements) of 345% appears quite modest. 26946 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Wikileaks Reveals Chinese Top Officials Say Not To Trust Country's Economic Data In Advance Of Tomorrow's "Future Of Housing Finance" Kabuki Theater; Or Why The GSE Zombies Will Suck The US Middle Class Dry Forever, Amen Are The BRICs Broken? Goldman And Roubini Disagree On China Guest Post: Central Planning's Christmas Problem Even Goldman Says China Is Cooking The Books
Credit Shock Dead Ahead: China Money Formation Soars To 2-Year High As Delinquent Loans Surge By 29% Submitted by Tyler Durden on 05/10/2013 08:33 -0400 Capital Markets China Credit Conditions Gross Domestic Product Housing Market Housing Prices M2 non-performing loans Real estate Reality SocGen Yuan A month ago we pointed out that even as the Chinese credit bubble - at a record 240% of GDP on a consolidated basis - is now clearly out of control, the far more disturbing aspect of China's credit-fueled economy is the ever declining boost to economic growth as a result of every incremental dollar created. Indeed, as the economic response to "credit shock" becomes lower and lower, even as the inflationary impact lingers, the PBOC is caught between a stagnating rock and an inflationary hard place. Nonetheless, there are few options and with the shark-like need to continue growing, or at least moving, in order to prevent collapse, China did precisely what we expected it to do: boost credit growth even more despite the obvious tapering economic impact of such money creation. Sure enough, overnight China reported that its M2 growth accelerated in April from 15.7% in March, to 16.1% on a Y/Y basis: the fastest pace of credit creation in two years . Yes, the PBOC may not be creating money, but the Chinese pseudo-sovereign commercial banks, sure are, and at a pace that puts the rest of the world to shame. From SocGen: China’s M2 growth accelerated unexpectedly from 15.7% yoy in March to 16.1% yoy in April (Cons. 15.5%; SG 15.2%), the fastest pace in two years. Although a base effect was partly responsible, it is also the case that credit conditions continued to be very accommodative. The bigger than anticipated new bank lending figure – CNY 792.9bn or 26.9% yoy – is one piece of proof. Although the flow of total social financing normalised lower from CNY 2.5tn in March to CNY 1.7tn, the stock growth sped up further to 22.3% yoy from 21.6% yoy. And there are those who wonder why food prices soared in April despite the obviously contractionary tumble in the PPI... Furthermore, as we pointed out two days ago when we looked at the glaringly obvious export data manipulation, the idle-money inflationary pressures in China are likely far, far worse than what is reported, and with the SHCOMP unable to absorb excess liquidity due to its shallow nature (unlike the SP or the Nikkei225), and with the government establishing new and improved housing market curbs with every passing day, all this soaring hot money is about to spill over into the economy, and which point it will not be the USD that Chinese consumers flocks to in order to preserve their wealth (hint: see 2011 when China had its last episode of outright spiking inflation). But, as usually happens, that's just half of story. Since in China, unlike the G-0 world, loan creation is still mediated by commercial banks (at least as long as the PBOC continues to sit on the sidelines), and not sourced directly by the monetary authority which can absorb virtually infinite bad loans before faith in the currency is shaken, the problem of bad loans is starting to become quite tangible. As China Daily reports , citing PwC research, the total mount of overdue loans among China's top 10 listed banks exploded by 29% in one year, rising to $79.3 billion at the end of 2012 compared to 2011. Bad loans are weighing heavily on China's top commercial banks this year, and are likely to hit profitability and asset quality, a report released by PwC claimed on Thursday. The study revealed that total overdue loans among the country's top 10 listed banks had increased to 486.5 billion yuan ($79.3 billion) by the end of last year, up 29 percent from 2011. The average overdue loan ratio rose to 1.21 percent from 1.06 percent, "a considerable deterioration", said Jimmy Leung, PwC's banking and capital markets leader for China. In some regions, the ratio reached 5 to 7 percent, he added. The ratio of special-mention loans, debts that could potentially turn sour, among the five largest joint stock banks rose to 1.03 percent in 2012 from 2011's 0.93 percent. Chinese banks follow the international five-category system that classifies loans as "pass", "special-mention", "substandard", "doubtful" and "loss", in line with their inherent risks. The last three groups are regarded as non-performing loans. And here's another reason why China finds itself in a dead end dilemma with no way out: on one hand it does not want any more housing inflation for obvious bubble reasons. On the other, any collapse in housing prices will crash its banking sector. What to do? "The economic uncertainties and tightened rules on the real estate market would pose a tougher test for commercial lenders this year," added Raymond Yung, PwC's financial services leader for China. "If property prices show big declines, bank lending would be in jeopardy....It's time for Chinese banks to strengthen their management of collecting repayments, and writing off more soured loans more positively." Only they can't, because that process would require the full disclosure of just how bad the true delinquent loan state of the commercial banking sector is. And since this is China, where economic data is always misreported by orders of magnitude, one truly is scared to look beneath the surface, and where such an event can be delayed (not avoided), only as long as new loan creation is soaring and is sufficiently high to offset the conversion of performing loans into NPLs. Which, perhaps explains, why April new credit soared to the highest in two years. And this in turn, will be curbed too, once inflation - that ultimate arbiter of reality - comes roaring back. In the meantime, and as always, we take delight in all amusing gold "smashes", "crashes", or whatever else they are called, as we continue to recall just what asset the Chinese bought with both hands and feet in all markets - physical and paper - in 2011, when China's inflation went off the charts. Because it wasn't the USD, and because we know that this time will not be different. Average: 4.857145 Your rating: None Average: 4.9 ( 7 votes) Tweet - advertisements - Change is about to catch Republicans by surprise. A financial journalist says a scandal brewing in DC will catch most Republicans by surprise, and will alter the political system. Login or register to post comments 9809 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: What Really Goes On In China China's 'Non-Performing Loan' Nightmare When Will Deposit Haircuts Take Place In Other European Countries? FRBNY President And Former Goldman Partner Dudley Discusses Politicization Of The Fed Guest Post: China: Continued Boom Or Bursting Bubble?
The "Undisputed Housing Recovery" Is Unmissable On This New Home Sales Chart Submitted by Tyler Durden on 01/25/2013 10:23 -0500 Census Bureau New Home Sales Reality recovery St Louis Fed We could bore readers with the just announced New Homes Sales data from the Census Bureau , which put a somewhat largish dent in the "undisputed" housing recovery fairytale taking place in America (perhaps in the Hamptons, and triplexes in Manhattan where the NAR continues to launder Chinese and Russian oligarch money) such as: December new homes sales, seasonally adjusted annualized, dropped from an upward revised 398K (was 377K) to 369K on expectations of a 385K print; That this was the biggest M/M drop since February 2011; That months supply rose from 4.5 to 4.9, the highest since January 2012; That on an unadjusted, actual basis, a tiny 26K houses were actually sold in December, compared to 24K last December, of which just 2K in the Northeast; That a whopping 1,000 houses were sold in the $750,000 and over category That houses for sale rose to 150K, the highest since December of 2011 That the punditry already spun this as being due to lack of clarity over the Fiscal Cliff and tax hikes, when in reality with expectations of higher taxes, consumers would have spent more money on hard assets in December, but why not regurgitate generic stupidity... Or we could just show this chart of the non-seasonally adjusted, unannualized New Home Sales in the past decade, and ask: just where is this recovery everyone keeps on talking about ? Source: St Louis Fed Average: 4.8 Your rating: None Average: 4.8 ( 20 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 15731 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Guest Post: Will John Paulson Be Wrong This Time? Pimco Vs Shilling: The Housing Bull Vs Bear Debate No Housing Recovery On This Chart Either The Chart That Proves The Fed's Policies Have Been A Failure 18.8 Million Vacant Homes In Q3, Seasonally Adjusted Homeownership Rate At Decade Low
China's Economy "Bottoming Out"? - Not So Fast! Submitted by Tyler Durden on 12/04/2012 14:27 -0500 China Fitch Gross Domestic Product Michael Pettis ratings Reuters While China's equity index continues to plumb new depths, the macro data of the past two weeks has been the crutch for US equity bulls losing faith in the fiscal cliff negotiations - growth is up, investment is up, and inflation is down - with analysts hailing the news as evidence that the Chinese economy has "truly bottomed out." As Michael Pettis, of China Financial Markets , notes though "I think we need to be very cautious and refrain from allowing ourselves to get too caught up in the huge sigh of relief that the sell side is heaving . Growth rates in China will continue to slow dramatically in the next few years, and if there are temporary lulls, as there must be, these do not represent any sort of “bottoming out” at all." His perspective is simply that Beijing cannot afford 'politically' to allow the transition/adjustment/reforms to take place too fast - and occasionally needs "to step on the investment accelerator." The bottom-line, he notes, is that " you can get as much growth as you like if you expand credit, but once expanding credit has become the problem, it cannot also be a permanent solution to slower growth . The country’s balance sheet continues to deteriorate – and the most recent growth spurt implies faster deterioration – and this, ultimately, is the main constraint of the Chinese growth model." SHCOMP vs HSI or Industrial Output vs PMI Via Michael Pettis, China Financial Markets : The big news in the past two weeks has been the slew of economic data suggesting that China has firmly turned the corner on its economic closedown. ... I think we need to be very cautious and refrain from allowing ourselves to get too caught up in the huge sigh of relief that the sell side is heaving . Growth rates in China will continue to slow dramatically in the next few years, and if there are temporary lulls, as there must be, these do not represent any sort of “bottoming out” at all. They simply represent the fact that Beijing cannot afford politically to allow the adjustment to take place too quickly , and from time to time Beijing is are going to step on the investment accelerator to speed things up temporarily. More credit Doing so of course will only make the adjustment longer and more painful , but given how difficult politically the transition to a balanced economy is likely to be, we would be crazy to expect otherwise. ... You can get as much growth as you like if you expand credit , but once expanding credit has become the problem, it cannot also be a permanent solution to slower growth. The country’s balance sheet continues to deteriorate – and the most recent growth spurt implies faster deterioration – and this, ultimately, is the main constraint of the Chinese growth model. Within the banking sector we are seeing all kinds of strains as companies and banks stretch for liquidity. Large-company receivables are growing quickly, as are payables (no one, it seems, wants to part with cash), loans simply are not getting repaid, and deposits are no longer growing, perhaps because flight capital is more than enough to offset China’s very high trade surplus. ... Remember that thanks to disguised flight capital and commodity stockpiling the surplus is almost certainly a lot larger than reported, and yet banks are still feeling the liquidity squeeze . And for all their happy noises, the authorities nonetheless are worried, at least about certain parts of the banking system. ... Most worrying of all Charlene Chu, perhaps the only analyst who actually understand what is happening in the banking system, released a new report with Fitch Ratings that is described in a Reuters article : Fitch Ratings says faster growth of broad credit in Q312 was one factor behind the recent improvement in Chinese economic data . In a comment published today, the agency highlights that, after slowing from Q411 to Q212, broad credit is back on track to surpass CNY17trn (USD2.7trn) in 2012. Fitch’s measure of broad credit includes shadow and offshore sources omitted from the central bank’s official total societal financing metric. “ This marks the fourth year in a row that net new credit will exceed one-third of GDP ,” said Charlene Chu, Head of Chinese banks’ ratings at Fitch. At current growth rates, by 2013 China’s banking sector assets will have expanded by nearly USD14trn since 2008. This is equivalent to replicating the entire US commercial banking sector in just five years . Such massive balance sheet expansion has limits, according to the agency. You can accelerate investment forever It is, to me, astonishing that China in just five years is “replicating the entire US commercial banking sector”, and yet so many analysts are expressing delight with China’s return to growth. Of course you can generate growth if you force such a tremendous expansion in credit, but this is simply unsustainable. I know I’ve said this many times, and I apologize for boring regular readers, but while I expected that politics would require a jump in growth over the rest of this year and the beginning of the next, this “good growth” tells us nothing about the health of the underlying economy. It only tells us how difficult politically the transition is likely to be. My guess is that the more difficult the consolidation of power, the longer the period of above 7% growth – so the happier the sell-side analysts are, the more worried long-term investors should be. At some point growth will start dropping rapidly again, and of course the same analysts who are now hailing the return to rapid growth will assure you, when growth begins to slow sharply again, that this was part of Beijing’s plan and was fully predictable. China is slowing because Beijing wants it to slow, they will say, and that’s a good thing. Meanwhile the fact that China is speeding up is also a good thing. ... I also published for Foreign Policy last week a longer piece on the challenges facing the new leadership in China . My main argument in the Foreign Policy piece is that both historical precedents and a common sense understanding of the rebalancing process suggest that politics, not economics, will determine China’s success . So far Beijing has succeeded largely because of its ability to collect and control the total savings of the country, and unleash waves of investment whenever necessary. Many countries have done the same things, but once credit expansion is no longer efficiently invested, few countries have made the transition to a different growth model . Powerful groups who benefitted from the old growth model – in China they are referred to generically as “vested interests” – have always succeeded in diluting or preventing the necessary reforms. The rebalancing always occurs anyway, either in the form of a debt crisis and negative growth or in the form of a long period of no growth and slow rebalancing. Some times – very rarely – the country completes the rebalancing and then moves swiftly on to becoming a developed country, but this doesn’t happen often. Of the dozens of developing economies that have experienced investment-driven growth miracles in the past 100 years, the only ones that have managed the transition to developed country status are South Korea, Taiwan, and maybe Chile. This is a pretty limited success ratio. China’s previous success, in other words, tells us noting about how it will manage the next stage, and the precedents give us little reason to assume that the country can’t help but advance to the next stage of development. In fact the more confident Beijing is that it will manage the transition successfully, the less likely it is to succeed, which is why I am delighted that policy advisors seem so much more pessimistic than sell-side analysts. What happens to China will be determined largely by the political decisions it will make in the next few years, and it is foolish to assume we know how things will turn out. Average: 4.8 Your rating: None Average: 4.8 ( 5 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 5183 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: The Three Toughest Questions For China Bulls Charting The Undoing Of Credit-Fueled Globalization The Far More Important 'Election' Part 1: China's Political Process Why The Real Earnings Picture Is Bad And Getting Worse Guest Post: Ceilings, Cliffs And TAG - 3 Immediate Risks
Why Chinese Inflation Risk Is Over Three Times Greater Than In America Submitted by Tyler Durden on 08/21/2012 12:55 -0400 As everyone awaits (or doubts) the next coordinated central planning bank action - whether Fed QE (Lockhart stymied?), ECB 'bottomless pockets' (Merkel's back), or China RRR (reverse repos?) - the prices of things we need (as opposed to want) continue to rise. Nowhere is this more important than in China with its extremely high levels (and volatility) of deposit flows increasingly levered to re-inflationary actions by the PBoC. The critical aspect of the following analysis is that in the US, the stock market acts as an 'inflation buffer' for the rich's excess disposable income ; in China, this is not the case and given the greater than 3.4x leverage compared to the US, PBoC actions flow much more rapidly through the populace to the things they need - and right now more inflation is not what they need or want - which perhaps explains the reverse-repo 'gradual' tightening. 1) Chinese deposit volatility is massively high and extremely prone to 'inverse' window-dressing (as Bloomberg's chart of the day pointed out yesterday) which makes the PBoC's role as credit-monitor very hard . The chart below shows the outrageously obvious pump up in deposits (lower pane) as banks offer incentives to attract deposits and meet PBoC regulatory needs - only to let them flow back out and tighten their offers after... 2) This exaggerates any mistake or action they make but more critically the fact that in the US Depo-to-GDP is 0.55: 1 (USD8.8tn Deposits against USD15.8tn GDP) but in China it is 1.9:1 (USD13.8tn Deposits against USD7.3tn GDP - USD equivalent) - a 3.45x ratio that greatly exacerbates any easing impact of a RRR as deposits flow more dramatically ; which leads to a critical and most important point; 3) Why do Chinese people not like their stock market? In the US those 'deposits' flow straight into an inflation buffer - the US equity market (or AAPL) . The lack of flows into Chinese stocks given the size of their deposits suggests legacy savings attitudes remain solid or fear of fraud are prevalent. The point being that if the US had the same amount of cash in deposits as China (on a relative basis), the US would have an epic inflation problem right now but since the rich, who have all the disposable income, simply redirect cash into the stock casino market, stocks serve as an inflation offset. Without a wholesale shift in Chinese attitudes towards risk, given their clear 'trust' issues, inflationary impacts of PBoC action will remain far more important than the Fed's (for now).
W(h)ither China? "The End Of Extrapolation" By Tyler Durden Created 11/22/2012 - 22:55 Submitted by Tyler Durden on 11/22/2012 22:55 -0500 China Corporate Leverage Corruption default Eurozone fixed France Global Economy Gross Domestic Product Reality Sovereign Debt On November 5, just as the 18th Chinese Congress was about to elect a leadership that would merely perpetuate the status quo, in " The Chinese Credit Bubble - Full Frontal " we presented a little known fact: namely that while China's sovereign debt is whatever the country wishes it to be (which due to the SOE basis of its banks is really a hybrid of sovereign and financial debt), one bubble that the country can not hide is that of its corporate debt level, which has hit the highest relative to GDP level in the enitre world. Ten days later Businessweek followed up with " Corporate China's Black Hole of Debt ", which contained the following replica chart: And so the cat of China's real debt bubble is out of the bag and out for general consumption. Yet as promptly as it appeared, it was forgotten, as a desperate for any favorable economic news punditry has ignored the fact that economic data coming out of China is merely for propaganda purposes and consumption by the gullible (not our words, they belong to China's current Vice Premier and the man who will soon take the post of Premier, Li Keqiang, who 5 years ago said that " China's GDP figures are "man-made" and therefore unreliable ... figures, especially GDP statistics, are 'for reference only,' he said smiling. "), and has latched on to the prior month of modestly more favorable, "rebounding" economic statistics. As UBS George Magnus says, "Many people think the downswing has now ended, pointing to slightly feistier data in September and October for industrial production, fixed asset investment, retail sales, and exports, continued high levels of total social financing, and a renewed rise in corporate leverage." The trivial rebound will soon end but a far bigger problem will then reemerge: " the short-term outlook for growth pales into significance against the view that China will continue to grow at 7-8.5% for the foreseeable future ." And herein lies the rub: because while China is currently experiencing a brief dead cat bounce, a far greater question remains open: can China reverse its declining GDP growth rate and continue growing at what most realists now perceive as an unsustainable pace . Says Magnus in attempting to provide an answer: "This rests on three critical but questionable propositions: political will and capacity, the insensitivity of consumption to the investment outlook, and the nature of rebalancing, itself." Magnus then proceeds to share his vision of whether China can "rise above" the reality of an economy forced to transition from investment driven to one of consumption: a vision which is the topic of his latest paper titled " China: the end of extrapolation ." In short, his answer (which at 11 single-spaced pages is hardly short) is that the party in China has ended. Of course, he is far more diplomatic: After a decade or more of turbo-charged growth, the economic model that drove it has led to deep imbalances, especially as regards the investment and consumption shares of GDP, significant increases in both the investment- and credit-intensity of GDP growth, and the distribution of income between profits and wages. A host of institutional, monetary, financial, tax and other fiscal arrangements has been developed to support this economic model. As we will explain below, changing this model has become of paramount importance if China is to avoid a disruptive bust in investment in the next 1-2 years, and lapse into a middle income trap in the medium-term. A change is all the more important as China’s competitive advantages in the global economy are slowly being chipped away by rising wage and labour cost pressures at home, and the development of cheap energy and new lower-cost, advanced manufacturing technologies in the US, South Korea and other OECD countries. The biggest issue for a largely welfare safety-net free China has been balancing economic growth with broad prosperity. Focusing just on one, can and will promptly lead to social instability and "rising pressure": Social pressures have continued to build with respect to income inequality, corruption, living and working conditions of migrant workers, miscarriages of justice and ‘land grabs’ by local government officials, and air and water quality and environmental degradation. According to one Chinese sociologist, the number of incidents of unrest may have been of the order of 180,000 in 2010. So China has to keep growing at the required pace of 7%+ to keep the population mostly satisfied. But how, now that as noted above, the "turbo-charged" growth period is over. And how when the new Chinese Politburo leaders are even more conservative than the old ones, and even less willing to force the much required transition from an investment-driven to a consumption-led model. The first proposition, following on from the political economy issues discussed above, is that the government has the political will and capacity to introduce reforms that lead to both a sharp fall in the investment share of GDP, and a roughly equivalent rise in the consumption share by strengthening or introducing important adjustment mechanisms discussed earlier. But we don’t know yet how strong the climate for reform in China is, even though there is a popular feeling that things can’t carry on as before. Some initiatives of political reform, aimed at restoring trust in the Party by curbing corruption and ‘purifying’ the Party so as to prevent the abuse of power for personal gain, certainly seem likely. More radical political reform, though, doesn’t look likely. ... This raises questions about the wider significance of rebalancing, which means reforms that would abandon the key drivers of the ‘old model’, including wage rises significantly below productivity growth, repressed interest rates, a managed exchange rate, and other subdued factor prices, that is, of land, water, energy, and importantly, of capital. There is little question that, over a decade and more, a correction of repressed factor prices, money and capital especially, would help to generate the resource shift needed to drive a more household- and private enterprise-oriented economy, and strengthen resource allocation, efficiency, innovation and total factor productivity. We can be hopeful that China’s new leaders will reform gradually in this direction. But intent will count for little in the face of inertia or a concerted push-back or resistance from others in the Party and the state apparatus, and it may be prudent to remain cautious. Remember that fundamental economic reforms are all about politics that are highly controversial and could, in some respects perhaps, prove to be of existential significance to the Party. So while politics is certainly the primary consideration for what is still largely a centrally-planned economy, an even bigger concern may be simple math. The maths are problematic . If investment is 50% of GDP and the growth rate falls from 15% to say, 5% per annum, consumption growth has to accelerate from about 8% to an unprecedented 12% per annum or so if the underlying GDP growth rate is to stay at 7.5%. You can do the maths of alternative scenarios at leisure, but the bottom line is that rebalancing requires investment to grow more slowly than GDP, and consumption significantly faster over an extended period of time. Otherwise the model isn’t changing. The more structural reason is that the mechanisms that would allow consumer spending to strengthen further don’t yet exist, and would, in any event, compromise the legacy sources of economic growth that have generated structural imbalances in the first place. For example, higher wages dent corporate profits and investment; higher interest rates and a stronger exchange rate help consumers, but to the disadvantage of companies, whose debt-servicing capacity would be compromised; pro-household tax, income and social security reforms have to be financed, one way or another, by companies, or the government . The issue, specifically in China, is more about the speed of capital accumulation, and misallocation of capital, given that, uniquely, the investment share of GDP has been in a range of 40-50% for about a decade now. Roughly two-thirds of the stock of capital has been built in the last decade, and half of infrastructure investment since 2000, for example, has been in transportation projects, many of which serve the same objectives, and must, for a while at least, be redundant or not viable commercially.15 And while total factor productivity growth, which is a measure of the efficiency of capital and labour utilisation, did rise strongly during the 2000s to about 4% per annum as the pre-imbalances apex boom gathered momentum, it has fallen back to around 2% per annum since. But perhaps the biggest concern is the one that needs no introduction on this website, and is always summarized simply in what is the real four letter word: debt . It is well known that China has experienced strong credit expansion. The growth in regular RMB loans by banks may have slowed down from about 35% in 2009, to a more modest 15% since the middle of 2011, but these loans capture only half of China’s credit creation. Total social financing includes also a number of informal financing arrangements, including commercial bills, trust and entrusted loans, other trust assets and corporate bonds not held by banks. The last item, in particular has been growing rapidly, reaching a record RMB 300bn in October 2012. The different definitions of credit creation are shown in the following chart, which comes from a research note by UBS China economist, Tao Wang. The chart differentiates between regular bank loans, the total of bank credit and off-balance sheet credit, and total credit in the economy. As hown, the broadest credit share of GDP has grown from about 150% in 2007 to around 200% in the last 5 years, quite unprecedented for a country of China’s size. The rising credit intensity in the economy is also evident in the changes in the relationship between total social financing and GDP. Between 2002 when the former data start and 2007, credit outstanding grew by RMB17 trillion, compared with a rise in GDP of RMB14.5 trillion, a ratio of 1.2, but since then, credit has soared by nearly RMB61 trillion, compared to a rise in GDP of RMB25.5 trillion, or a ratio of 2.. The biggest expansion in debt financing has occurred in the corporate sector. Chinese companies’ debt ratios have risen to join some of the most indebted corporate sectors in major countries, according to Li Yang, vice-president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.19 At 107%, the ratio is right up there with those of the US, Canada, France and the Eurozone, though the standardised OECD ratios may not accord to Li Yang’s definition. But he noted the recent BIS warning that corporate debt levels over 90% of GDP make companies increasingly sensitive to changes in income and interest rates, financial fragility and default risk. These things are liable to weigh on SOEs and other companies, as GDP growth slows, profits and cash flows weaken and in the wake of expected financial liberalisation. And, inevitably, tougher times for orrowers mean tougher times for banks. Most people doubt the officially estimated 0.97% is a realistic number, and higher loan losses are inevitable. China is better equipped financially than most to deal with banking sector loan loss or recapitalisation issues. The point, though, is that someone has to pay: the cost is almost bound to fall on the household sector, one way or another, and so where does that leave rebalancing? Most ominously, however, is the realization that China too is now engaging in the developed world's favorite pastime, simply known as "kicking the can". Unfortunately, it isn’t really possible for us, or more to the point, China’s government, to know precisely where the country stands in this process, any more than people were able to gauge where the West was in 2006, for example. A Chinese Minsky Moment, to coin another phrase, may not be imminent. In a highly managed economy with dominant state industrial and banking sectors, the state can deploy policies, and sources of finance to minimise cyclical fluctuations (as now), helping to sustain the status quo and lowering perceptions of risk. But this is the equivalent of ‘kicking the can’ at the risk of a harsher and more disruptive adjustment later Finally, Magnus on what happens if instead of the hoped for 8% trendline growth, China can at best muster half of the previous 10% growth rate: The incremental changes in economic rebalancing, and gradual deceleration in investment spending, which are implicit in the extrapolations of 7-8% GDP growth, don’t stack up for this scribe. A more significant fall to 5% over the coming decade – to pick a number – need not be the cataclysm that springs to mind, unless you’re a dyed-in-the-wool industrial commodities and commodity currency bull.... A halving of China’s superlative growth rate would still see GDP double by 2027, and continue to converge on the US. And since we can imagine China’s citizens care more about living standards than GDP, a change in the economic model and in its incentive systems need not be threatening, if the process is managed well and in a timely fashion. But there’s an unfortunate truth about changing your development model, which is that when you get to the point of having to do so, sustainable and stable growth and prosperity are about politics, institutions and legitimacy. You have reached the end of extrapolation. Much more in the full paper below, which is a perceptive analysis to be sure, but really one which puts into words what the simple chart at the very top of this article succinctly summarizes without a single word: that the age of credit-driven expansion is over, in the entire developed world, as well as in China, as China too succumbs to the tractor beam of peak consolidated (or is that fungible?) leverage . Because without the ability to create any more debt, and thus money, out of thin air without the threat of an ensuing debt delinquency, discharge and default avalanche, there is no more growth. Full George Magnus paper on China : Tweet
Russell Napier's "Most Important Chart In The World" Submitted by Tyler Durden on 11/22/2012 11:28 -0500 China Global Economy Recession recovery Yield Curve Hopes for an early recovery in the global economy may be overoptimistic, according to CLSA's Russel Napier, as he notes the expansion of China's reserves, which has been an engine of global economic growth, is about to come to a shuddering halt. As eFinancial News notes , Chinese reserves have decelerated dramatically over the last five years and are now close to zero. Napier said of the graph: "It is the most important chart in the world. The growth in Chinese reserves has determined all the key developments in financial markets in the last two decades. It printed lots of currency and artificially depressed the US yield curve. It has been the cornerstone of global growth, and now it's over ." Via eFinancial News : ... The last time the Chinese reserve growth rate was below 10% was at the end of the 1990s, just before the bursting of the technology stock market bubble and a recession. The recovery in the growth rate from 2001 onwards was followed by the economic boom of the last decade. The growth rate turned down decisively in 2007, just before the onset of the financial crisis. China's reserves have come from a trading surplus, and the Chinese authorities have used the money to buy US Treasury bonds. The finance that China supplied to the US helped fuel economic growth in that country and the rest of the world. Once again, we are reminded that it is the flow not the stock that counts for 'growth' is credit expansion and credit is growth... Average: 5 Your rating: None Average: 5 ( 7 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 13588 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Are 401(k) Loan Defaults Set To Resurge? Frontrunning: August 25 Guest Post: The Lie That Is Social Security Desperate Acts Of Government Continued - Europe Edition Broken Promises: Pensions All Over America
I am interested in making valued contributions to this community (pinggu.org), but I sometimes find it difficult to do so with the language barrier (I am an english speaker). To anyEnglishspeakers: Please inform me if I violate any guidelines. I appreciate any advice which will help me to become a better member (I aspire to be VIP or PHD status, in spite of the existing language barrier - I hope I am not being unrealistic). Furthermore, if anybody is willing to advise me on how to proactively become a better member, make better contributions, and earn more *forum currency*, experience, credit, academics, etc. - please contact me. I would appreciate it! Sincerely, Killahbeez
标签: Chinese经管大学堂：名校名师名课
京公网安备 11010802022788号
论坛法律顾问：王进律师
知识产权保护声明
免责及隐私声明
