1.Mercury_water ice; 2.Venus_the water; 3.Planets bombarded with asteroids_the three most important reasons; 4.Mars_the two most important reasons that Mars is a cold planet; 5.The asteroid Vesta does not have an atmosphere;
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Some Stock Markets Are More Equal Than Others: Global Performance Since 2009 Submitted by Tyler Durden on 07/28/2012 12:19 -0400 Back in March 2009, when the US financial system was imploding, one of market oddities was that European financial risk was far more muted than that of its American counterparts, with European stock markets trading, on a relative basis, far better than the epic collapse that the SP had just experienced having plunged by over 50% in months. It was this freefall that forced the Fed to take on the most daring capital markets rescue attempt ever attempted, and by injecting and guaranteeing tens of trillions at the nadir of the financial crisis, it spawned a doubling of the US stock markets (at a huge cost: US capital markets are now all centrally planned, and the price of gold: that inverse indicator of faith in fiat currencies, has also doubled in the past 4 years following an epic fiat dilution orgy). Over the same time period, Europe has demonstrated what happens to capital markets when there is no central planner willing and able to accept the risk of runaway inflation in the future (not to mention soaring deficits and deferred austerity) in exchange for instant stock market gratification right here, right now. End result: the French, Italian and Spanish stocks markets have barely budged since their 2009 lows (and Spain is well below). How does this look in the context of all global stock markets on a Price to Book ratio? The answer is below. The next logical question becomes: just why is the global investor willing to pay over 2 times book value for the average US stock, and unwilling to pay more than 0.8 Book for Italy and Spain. And how long until the realization that the rickety house of cards supporting the US stock market's 2.0+ P/B ratio is resting purely on the shoulders of a profligate Fed now that US corporations have once again resumed their downward "profitability" trajectory? 9490 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: Bill Gross On Doo Doo Economics Things That Make You Go Hmmm - Such As The Spread Between Gold And Gold Miners Futures Tumble, Spreads At Record, Euro Drops On Another Awful Spanish Auction; More LCH Margin Hike Rumors "China Accounts For Nearly Half Of World's New Money Supply" A Record $2 Trillion In Deposits Over Loans - The Fed's Indirect Market Propping Pathway Exposed
He Who Deleverages Best: Presenting The 'Credit Intensity' Of Europe's GDP Growth Submitted by Tyler Durden on 07/21/2012 14:06 -0400 Belgium Finland France Germany Global Economy Gross Domestic Product Ireland Italy Neo-Keynesian non-performing loans Portugal Reality Sovereign Debt There exist those pathological Economics 101 acolytes who say that no matter what happens in the global economy, since it is all supposedly a closed system, whether one incurs leverage at the sovereign or private-sector level is largely irrelevant, and that is all translates into economic growth as long as the system is experincing a net leverage increase. Usually these same acolytes come up with economic theories which attempt to validate and justify infinite sovereign debt incurrence, usually to explain why socialism can be funded (if only in various formerly capitalist societies). At the heart of their thinking is the Kalecki profits equation which says that: Profits = Investment – Household Savings – Government Savings – Foreign Savings + Dividends Or in other words, as long as the non-government sector is expanding its savings (reducing leverage), aggregate economic output remains the same as long as the government is doing the opposite. Of course, as we explained before this equality breaks immediately in a real world in which one evaluates the impact of asset age, amortization, depreciation and otherwise the impact of reality on profitability. But does that mean that every economics theory that says corporate deleveraging is offset by sovereign leverage is wrong? Not necessarily. it just says that there is far more to the final outcome than what an Neo-Keynesian Econ 101 textbook alleges. To evaluate the impact of private sector deleveraging on economic growth/GDP in the context of a rapidly releveraging sovereign, we present the following analysis from Citi which observes various European countries and analyzes the "credit intensity" of GDP growth, or in other words which country has preserved, or even grown its GDP even as its private sector has seen substantial deleveraging. The results are interesting and may present a framework for evaluation the winners and losers in Europe in the era of "great sovereign leveraging", permitting a reverse engineering of the success stories, and applying their lessons to the losers. Citi has compiled data analyzing private sector leverage and cross referenced it to countries who have seen massive sovereign debt expansion in the past 5 years, however offset with various degrees of private sector deleveraging. The results are as follows : Given the persistent tensions from the financial sphere and the precarious situation of some banking systems, it is interesting to compare how much leverage has been accumulated in the last ten years in various euro area member states and how much economic activity was generated during the same period (see Figure 4). This allows us to measure the ‘credit-intensity’ of GDP growth. In particular, we concentrate on the last five years to see whether the relationships have evolved. In peripheral countries such as Spain, the last two years (Q4 2009 to Q4 2011) saw a 16-point drop in the real credit outstanding without triggering a contraction in the level of economic activity. Over the same period, Ireland was perhaps the most successful peripheral country, with real credit outstanding shrinking by 57 points while the real GDP level rose by 4 points. In Portugal, while the reduction in real credit outstanding was more limited, worth 12 points in the last two year, the level of real GDP still declined, albeit by a modest 2 points. Italy is the only country within the peripheral group that experienced an increase in the amount of private sector real credit outstanding, with a gain of 5 points. Yet, the corresponding increase in real GDP was limited to just 2 points. Core and soft core countries recorded GDP gains, with Finland (7pt) and Germany (6pt) clearly in the lead, compared to Austria (5pt), Belgium (4pt) and France (3pt). Interestingly, Belgium managed to grow its GDP despite experiencing a clear deleveraging phase. Note that Germany is the only euro area member state to have recorded an increase in its GDP level since 2002 while its level of private sector credit outstanding has declined during the last decade . So while the occasional success story may exist, the danger is as always one of extrapolating into the future too far, especially a future in which private sector growth will very likely be even more constrained in the coming years. The danger is that expanding sovereign leverage will no longer be private sector offset, which it obviously is not in the general case, and will simply become a headwind to growth, at both the macro as well as micro levels. Looking ahead to the next few quarters, there is a clear risk that banks operating in peripheral countries will either maintain tight lending standards or restrict lending even more in the event of further increases in the proportion of non-performing loans. Unless those countries implement sufficiently comprehensive structural reforms to lift potential growth, economic activity is at risk of contracting further in the coming quarters, increasing investors concerns about debt sustainability. Average: 4.75 Your rating: None Average: 4.8 ( 8 votes) Tweet Login or register to post comments 6432 reads Printer-friendly version Send to friend Similar Articles You Might Enjoy: The Coming Pan-European Soverign Debt Crisis In the News This 29th Day of June, 2010: A Whole Bunch of “This Ain’t No Surprises” from Europe What Country is Next in the Coming Pan-European Sovereign Debt Crisis? I Suggest Those That Dislike Hearing “I Told You So” Divest from Western and Southern European Debt, It’ll Get Worse Before It Get’s Better! Gonzalo Lira On The Identity Of The False Religion Behind The Mask Of Economic "Science"
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