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美国经济学家埃尔文·罗斯(Alvin Roth)与罗伊德·沙普利(Lloyd Shapley)获得2012年诺贝尔经济学奖。
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著者: | Alvin E Roth; Lloyd S Shapley |
出版商: | Cambridge u.a. : Cambridge Univ. Pr., 1988. |
- Publisher: Cambridge University Press
- Number Of Pages: 340
- Publication Date: 1988-10-28
- ISBN-10 / ASIN: 052136177X
- ISBN-13 / EAN: 9780521361774
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The Shapley Value—— Essays in Honor of Lloyd S. Shapley
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Product Description:
Composed in honour of the sixty-fifth birthday of Lloyd Shapley,this volume makes accessible the large body of work that has grown outof Shapley’s seminal 1953 paper. Each of the twenty essays concernssome aspect of the Shapley value. Three of the chapters are reprints ofthe ‘ancestral’ papers: Chapter 2 is Shapley’s original 1953 paperdefining the value; Chapter 3 is the 1954 paper by Shapley and Shubikapplying the value to voting models; and chapter 19 is Shapley’s 1969paper defining a value for games without transferable utility. Theother seventeen chapters were contributed especially for this volume.The first chapter introduces the subject and the other essays in thevolume, and contains a brief account of a few of Shapley’s other majorcontributions to game theory. The other chapters cover thereformulations, interpretations and generalizations that have beeninspired by the Shapley value, and its applications to the study ofcoalition formulation, to the organization of large markets, toproblems of cost allocation, and to the study of games in which utilityis not transferable.
Table of Contents:
Preface
1. Introduction to the Shapley value Alvin E. Roth
Part I. Ancestral Papers:
2. A value for n-person games Lloyd S. Shapley
3. A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system Lloyd S. Shapley and Martin Shubik;
Part II. Reformulation and Generalizations:
4. The expected utility of playing a game Alvin E. Roth
5. The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices as probabilities Philip D. Straffin, Jr
6. Weighted Shapley values Ehud Kalai and Dov Samet
7. Probabilistic values for games Robert James Weber
8. Combinatorial representations of the Shapley value based on average relative payoffs Uriel G. Rothblum
9. The potential of the Shapley value Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell
10. Multilinear extensions of games Guillermo Owen
Part III. Coalitions:
11. Coalitional value Mordecai Kurz
12. Endogenous formation of links between players and the coalitions: an application of the Shapley value Robert J. Aumann and Roger B. Myerson
Part IV. Large Games:
13. Values of large finite games Myrna Holtz Wooders and William R. Zame
14. Payoffs in nonatomic economics: an axiomatic approach Pradeep Dubley and Abraham Neyman
15. Values of smooth nonatomic games: the method of multilinear approximation Dov Monderer and Abraham Neyman
16. Nondifferentiable TU markets: the value Jean-François Mertens
Part V. Cost Allocation and Fair Division:
17. Individual contribution and just compensation H. P. Young
18. The Aumann-Shapley prices: a survey Yair Tauman
Part VI. NTU Games:
19. Utility comparison and the theory of games Lloyd S. Shapley
20. Paths leading to the Nash set Michael Maschler, Guillermo Owen and Bezalel Peleg.