The Effects of Quantitative Easing_krishnamurthy.pdf
Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Crisis.pdf
Monetary policy zero lower bound williams.pdf
Flow and Stock Effects of Large-Scale Treasury Purchases.pdf
The Financial Market Effects of the Fed LSAP.pdf
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ALTERNATIVE MONETARY POLICY TOOLS.pdf
The impact of recent central bank asset purchase.pdf
Methods of Policy Accommodation.pdf
The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programs.pdf
2014-10-31 02:51:36 上传
How Effective Were Fed Bond Buys? What the QE Research Says
By Pedro Nicolaci da Costa, October 30, 2014
The Federal Reserve’s bond-buying may be coming to an end this week, but it is certain to live on for a while as a topic of economic research.
Many of the studies of large-scale asset purchases, known as quantitative easing or QE, agree they worked very well to prevent deflation and stabilize the financial system during the 2008 crisis, but disagree about how effective the programs have been in boosting growth since then.
Estimates of the impact of bond buys on financial variables—such as the yield on a 10-year Treasury note and on corporate bond spreads–vary significantly, as do assessments of the policy’s impact on the broader economy.
Here is a sample of what some of the most influential experts have said on the issue in recent years:
From Fed Officials:
“Monetary Policy since the Onset of the Crisis” by then-Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, August 2012.
Mr. Bernanke pointed to research from Fed staffers that found the first two round of bond buys “may have raised the level of output by almost 3 percent and increased private payroll employment by more than 2 million jobs, relative to what otherwise would have occurred.”
“Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: Putting Theory into Practice” by San Francisco Fed President John Williams, January 2014.
“Asset purchases have proven a potent but blunt tool, with uncertain effects on financial markets and the economy. In addition, there are nagging concerns that large-scale asset purchases carry with them particular risks to the economy or the health of the financial system that we still don’t understand well,” Mr. Williams found.
From Fed Researchers and Academic Economists:
“The Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programs: Rationale and Effects” by Stefania D’Amico, William English, David Lopez-Salido and Edward Nelson, October 2012.
This work attempts to identify the mechanisms through which bond buys affectedfinancial markets. It finds both a direct effect from the lowering of yields in the mortgage-backed securities and Treasurys bought by the Fed and a broader impact on other assets as investors adjust their portfolios to reflect the prospect of prolonged lower rates. “The estimates suggest that the scarcity and duration channels have both been of considerable importance for the transmission of purchases to longer-term Treasury yields,” the authors say.
“Methods of Policy Accommodation at the Interest-Rate Lower Bound” by Michael Woodford, September 2012 (presented at Kansas City Fed’s Jackson Hole symposium).
Mr. Woodford finds the Fed is able to offer greater support to economic growth by promising to keep interest rates low until the economy recovers, so-called forward guidance, than it does through asset purchases. “There seems little reason to believe that purchases of long-term Treasuries should be an effective way of lowering the kind of longer-term interest rates that matter most for stimulating economic activity,” he finds.
“The Impact of Recent Central Bank Asset Purchase Programs” by Jack Meaning and Feng Zhu, December 2011.
This paper finds asset purchases work better to prevent deflation and stem financial crises than they do to stimulate economic growth by themselves. “Both the Federal Reserve’s Large Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) program and the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility had a significant impact on financial markets when the first stages were announced, but the effects became smaller for later extensions of the programs.”
“The Effectiveness of Alternative Monetary Policy Tools in a Zero Lower Bound Environment” by James B. Hamilton and Jing Cynthia Wu, April 2011.
The Fed could have achieved just as much out of a large program of selling short-dated bonds to buy longer-dated ones as it did from buying $400 billion in long-term bonds outright with newly-created money, the authors find.
“The Financial Market Effects of the Federal Reserve’s Large-Scale Asset Purchases” by Joseph Gagnon, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache and Brian Sack, March 2011.
This work, whose lead author was involved in developing the Fed’s first bond-buying program, finds “the purchases led to economically meaningful and long-lasting reductions in longer-term interest rates on a range of securities, including securities that were not included in the purchase program.”
“The Effects of Quantitative Easing on Interest Rates” by Arvind Krishnamurthy and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, February 2011.
Countering the research of Mr. Gagnon et al, this paper finds a much narrower channel of transmission for the Fed’s bond purchases, most clearly in the buying of mortgage-backed securities while the housing market was impaired. “The impact of quantitative easing on MBS rates is large when QE involves MBS purchases, but not when it involves Treasury purchases.”
“Flow and Stock Effects of Large-Scale Treasury Purchases” by Stefanie D’Amico and Thomas B. King, September 2010.
The prevailing view among Fed officials is that bond buys work through their “stock” effect—that is, the total amount of stimulus is determined by the size of asset holdings, not the amount of monthly purchases. This paper finds both channels may be at work: “We find that each purchase operation, on average, caused a decline in yields in the sector purchased of 3.5 basis points on the days when these purchases occurred (the ‘flow effect’ of the program). In addition, the program as a whole resulted in a persistent downward shift in the yield curve of as much as 50 basis points (the ‘stock effect’), with the largest impact in the 10- to 15-year sector.”
08 makes the lackluster U.S. look marvelous by comparison. Unemployment in the eurozone today is higher than it was in 2009-10. Not only is real GDP still below its 2008 level, but it hasn’t grown for more than three years and may be heading down again. Meanwhile, deflation is more of a worry than inflation.