Hidden Reserve Prices with Risk-Averse Bidders
2 作者信息:
Huagang Li
GE Capital
Guofu Tan
Department of Economics, University of Southern California
3 出处: Huagang Li,Guofu Tan. Hidden Reserve Prices with Risk-Averse Bidders[J]. Front. Econ. China, 2017, 12(3): 341-370.
链接:
URL: |
http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/10.3868/s060-006-017-0015-4 http://journal.hep.com.cn/fec/EN/Y2017/V12/I3/341 |
4 摘要
面对风险厌恶型竞拍人的隐藏底价
李华刚
通用电气金融服务公司
谭国富
南加州大学经济系
摘要: 本文中我们为拍卖师缘何经常对底价进行隐瞒或保密提供了另一种解释。我们考量了在一个标准独立的私人价值环境中,买方规避风险,卖方则拥有关于拍卖对象的私人估价信息。卖方使用首价密封投标拍卖机制,结合公开的底价或隐藏的底价。我们比较了这两种策略下卖方事前预期收益,发现当买方为风险厌恶型,并在偏好和私人价值分布上受到特定限制时,最优隐藏底价政策能为卖方产生更高的期望收益。随着买家的数量增加,隐藏的底价更有可能占据主导地位。数量分析证明我们的主要研究结果具有普遍性。
Hidden Reserve Prices with Risk-Averse Bidders
Huagang Li
GE Capital
Guofu Tan
Department of Economics, University of Southern California
Abstract: In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for why auctioneers often keep the reserve price hidden or secret. We consider a standard independent private values environment in which the buyers are risk-averse and the seller has private information about her valuation of the object to be auctioned. The seller uses a first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism combined with either an announced reserve price or a hidden reserve price. We compare the seller’s ex ante expected profits under these two policies and find that the optimal hidden reserve price policy generates higher expected profits for the seller when the buyers are fairly risk-averse under particular restrictions on buyers’ preferences and the distributions of private values. As the number of the buyers increases, the hidden reserve price is more likely to dominate. Numerical methods are used to demonstrate the generality of our main results.