发帖
雷达卡
关键词：委托代理理论; 假设前提; 分析逻辑; 基本结论;
分类号：D913
委托代理理论述评_刘有贵.pdf
(295.87 KB, 需要: 3 个论坛币)
2.李富强，李斌.委托代理模型与激励机制分析[J]数量经济技术经济研究.2003(09)
摘要：本文在委托代理模型的基本框架下,对于风险态度与最优激励机制的关系进行了分析,利用不确定性等值的概念,具体分析了风险态度对激励效应的影响。并且分析了代理人的风险态度、企业经营情况与激励系数的关系。利用拉丰的显示原理,分析了代理人能力对于激励机制效应的影响。得到了与线性契约假设下相同的结论。究其根源,两者都是建立在参与约束和激励相容约束基础之上的。
关键词：风险; 激励机制; 代理人能力; 最优行动;
分类号：F224
委托代理模型与激励机制分析_李富强.pdf
(292.24 KB, 需要: 5 个论坛币)
3.郑志刚.投资者之间的利益冲突和公司治理机制的整合[J]经济研究.2004(02)
摘要：本文在企业家 (控制性投资者 )道德风险的框架下 ,探讨了内部和外部控制系统及其整合对降低由投资者之间的利益冲突所产生的代理成本的作用。我们证明 ,外部控制系统的存在 ,将使内部控制系统的监督功能加强 ,从而使公司治理机制整体形成对企业家道德风险行为的有效约束。当企业家与分散投资者所签订的合约满足企业家激励相容约束条件时 ,内部和外部控制系统表现为互补关系 ;否则 ,只有外部控制系统发挥作用 ,而不需要引入内部控制系统。因而二者的关系不是公司治理现有文献所认为的简单的单调关系
关键词：道德风险; 第二类代理成本; 外部控制系统; 内部控制系统; 机制整合;
分类号：F276.6
投资者之间的利益冲突和公司治理机制的整合_郑志刚.pdf
(326.32 KB, 需要: 7 个论坛币)
4.袁江天，张维.多任务委托代理模型下国企经理激励问题研究[J]管理科学学报.2006(03)
摘要：运用多任务委托代理模型研究国企经理的最优激励合同后得出,若多工作任务努力的激励成本之间相互独立,那么激励相容条件下的各工作任务的最优业绩报酬也是相互独立的,且最优业绩报酬是绝对风险规避度、边际激励成本变化率和可观测变量方差的递减函数;而如果多工作任务激励成本是相互依存的,那么在激励相容条件下,政治性活动和满足上级偏好的最优激励合同为“门槛型激励合同”,即只有当国企经理所创造的业绩超过一定的“门槛值”时,对其的激励才是正向的,否则将是负向的.并且定量地给出了国企经理的“门槛型激励条件”.
关键词：国有企业; 经理人激励; 多任务委托代理模型; 门槛型激励合同;
分类号：F272
多任务委托代理模型下国企经理激励问题研究_袁江天.pdf
(272.85 KB, 需要: 5 个论坛币)
5.郭其友，李宝良.机制设计理论:资源最优配置机制性质的解释与应用——2007年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主的主要经济学理论贡献述评[J]外国经济与管理.2007(11)
摘要：瑞典皇家科学院10月15日宣布,将2007年诺贝尔经济学奖授予美国经济学家里奥尼德.赫维茨(Leonid Hurwicz)、埃里克.S.马斯金(Eric S.Maskin)和罗杰.B.迈尔森(Roger B.Myerson),以表彰他们为机制设计理论的奠定及其发展所做出的卓越贡献。本文以机制设计理论的核心问题,即如何在信息分散和信息不对称的条件下设计激励相容的机制来实现资源的有效配置为线索,简要评述2007年度诺贝尔经济学奖得主的理论贡献以及机制设计理论对于我国经济体制改革的重要应用价值。
关键词：机制设计理论; 显示原理; 实施理论; 资源配置机制;
DOI：10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2007.11.001
分类号：F0
机制设计理论_资源最优配置机制性_省略_学奖得主的主要经济学理论贡献述评_郭其友.pdf
(281.91 KB, 需要: 7 个论坛币)
6.Ali Ghaffarinejad,Mohammad Kazem Akbari. An incentive compatible and distributed reputation mechanism based on context similarity for service oriented systems[J]. Future Generation Computer Systems,2013,29(3).
ABSTRACT:Abstract(#br)One major challenge in service oriented systems is how to establish a trusted relationship between different parties. A reputation mechanism is the best-known method to build trust and foster mutual cooperation. Reputation mechanisms require correct and honest feedback to function effectively. An incentive compatible reputation mechanism entices self-interested parties to report the truth by explicit rewards which can offset the potential profits that could be gained by lying. The existing incentive compatible mechanisms are centralized which gather feedback merely through a specific service offered by a service provider, while they ignore some useful information on other services that are offered by the same service provider. In this paper, we introduce a novel distributed reputation mechanism based on a number of special reputation centers (SRCs) for service oriented environments. Each SRC gathers reputation information for a predetermined service offered by different service providers. The proposed model is collusion resistant and offers incentives to SRCs for making an attempt at gathering reputation information thoroughly and report it honestly. We then also evaluate the integrity and effectiveness of the proposed mechanism by carrying out experiments under different settings of the electronic marketplace. Examination of the results confirms that the new approach outperforms other incentive compatible reputation solutions reported in the literature. 还原
KEYWORDS:Trust management; Distributed reputation mechanism; Incentive compatible; Service oriented architecture; Context similarity;
JOURNAL:Future Generation Computer Systems
SOURCE:Elsevierjournal
DOI:10.1016/j.future.2012.03.021
YEAR:2013
PAGES:863-875
PUBLISHER:Elsevier B.V.
1-s2.0-S0167739X12000866-main.pdf
(1.62 MB, 需要: 10 个论坛币)
7.Incentive compatible market design with applications
作者： M. Bumin Yenmez
作者单位： 1Carnegie Mellon University
刊名： International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, Vol.44 (3), pp.543-569
来源数据库： Springer Journal
DOI： 10.1007/s00182-014-0444-8
关键词： Auctions; Matching; Incomplete information; Incentive compatibility; Multidimensional types;
英文摘要： Abstract(#br)This paper studies markets for heterogeneous goods using mechanism-design theory. For each combination of desirable properties, we derive an assignment process with these properties in the form of a corresponding direct-revelation game, or we show that it does not exist. Each participant’s utility is quasi-linear in money, and depends upon the allocation that he gets and his privately known multidimensional ‘type.’ The key properties are incentive compatibility, individual rationality, efficiency, and budget balance. The main results characterize mechanisms that are ex post incentive compatible in combination with other properties.
10.1007%2Fs00182-014-0444-8.pdf
(588.45 KB, 需要: 7 个论坛币)
提升卡
置顶卡
沉默卡
变色卡
抢沙发
千斤顶
显身卡
京公网安备 11010802022788号
