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[教与学] CONTRACT THEORY (Patrick Bolton )(高清晰,非扫描版) [推广有奖]

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Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont
Contents
Preface xv
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Optimal Employment Contracts without Uncertainty, Hidden
Information, or Hidden Actions 4
1.2 Optimal Contracts under Uncertainty 7
1.2.1 Pure Insurance 8
1.2.2 Optimal Employment Contracts under Uncertainty 11
1.3 Information and Incentives 14
1.3.1 Adverse Selection 15
1.3.2 Moral Hazard 20
1.4 Optimal Contracting with Multilateral Asymmetric
Information 25
1.4.1 Auctions and Trade under Multilateral Private
Information 26
1.4.2 Moral Hazard in Teams, Tournaments, and
Organizations 27
1.5 The Dynamics of Incentive Contracting 30
1.5.1 Dynamic Adverse Selection 31
1.5.2 Dynamic Moral Hazard 34
1.6 Incomplete Contracts 36
1.6.1 Ownership and Employment 37
1.6.2 Incomplete Contracts and Implementation Theory 39
1.6.3 Bilateral Contracts and Multilateral Exchange 40
1.7 Summing Up 42
Part I STATIC BILATERAL CONTRACTING 45
2 Hidden Information, Screening 47
2.1 The Simple Economics of Adverse Selection 47
2.1.1 First-Best Outcome: Perfect Price Discrimination 48
2.1.2 Adverse Selection, Linear Pricing, and Simple
Two-Part Tariffs 49
2.1.3 Second-Best Outcome: Optimal Nonlinear Pricing 52
2.2 Applications 57
2.2.1 Credit Rationing 57
2.2.2 Optimal Income Taxation 62
2.2.3 Implicit Labor Contracts 67
2.2.4 Regulation 74
2.3 More Than Two Types 77
2.3.1 Finite Number of Types 77
2.3.2 Random Contracts 81
2.3.3 A Continuum of Types 82
2.4 Summary 93
2.5 Literature Notes 96
Hidden Information, Signaling 99
3.1 Spence's Model of Education as a Signal 100
3.1.1 Refinements 107
3.2 Applications 112
3.2.1 Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions
under Asymmetric Information 112
3.2.2 Signaling Changes in Cash Flow through Dividend
Payments 120
3.3 Summary and Literature Notes 125
Hidden Action, Moral Hazard 129
4.1 Two Performance Outcomes 130
4.1.1 First-Best versus Second-Best Contracts 130
4.1.2 The Second Best with Bilateral Risk Neutrality and
Resource Constraints for the Agent 132
4.1.3 Simple Applications 133
4.1.4 Bilateral Risk Aversion 135
4.1.5 The Value of Information 136
4.2 Linear Contracts, Normally Distributed Performance, and
Exponential Utility 137
4.3 The Suboptimality of Linear Contracts in the Classical
Model 139
4.4 General Case: The First-Order Approach 142
4.4.1 Characterizing the Second Best 142
4.4.2 When is the First-Order Approach Valid? 148
4.5 Grossman and Hart's Approach to the Principal-Agent
Problem 152
4.6 Applications 157
4.6.1 Managerial Incentive Schemes 157
4.6.2 The Optimality of Debt Financing under Moral
Hazard and Limited Liability 162
4.7 Summary 168
4.8 Literature Notes 169
Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information 171
5.1 Voluntary Disclosure of Verifiable Information 172
5.1.1 Private, Uncertifiable Information 172
5.1.2 Private, Certifiable Information 173
5.1.3 Too Much Disclosure 174
5.1.4 Unraveling and the Full Disclosure Theorem 175
5.1.5 Generalizing the Full Disclosure Theorem 176
5.2 Voluntary Nondisclosure and Mandatory-Disclosure Laws 178
5.2.1 Two Examples of No Disclosure or Partial
Voluntary Disclosure 179
5.2.2 Incentives for Information Acquisition and the
Role of Mandatory-Disclosure Laws 180
5.2.3 No Voluntary Disclosure When the Informed
Party Can Be Either a Buyer or a Seller 186
5.3 Costly Disclosure and Debt Financing 190
5.4 Summary and Literature Notes 197
Multidimensional Incentive Problems 199
6.1 Adverse Selection with Multidimensional Types 199
6.1.1 An Example Where Bundling Is Profitable 200
6.1.2 When Is Bundling Optimal? A Local Analysis 201
6.1.3 Optimal Bundling: A Global Analysis in the 2 x 2
Model 204
6.1.4 Global Analysis for the General Model 212
6.2 Moral Hazard with Multiple Tasks 216
6.2.1 Multiple Tasks and Effort Substitution 218
6.2.2 Conflicting Tasks and Advocacy 223
6.3 An Example Combining Moral Hazard and Adverse
Selection 228
6.3.1 Optimal Contract with Moral Hazard Only 230
6.3.2 Optimal Contract with Adverse Selection Only 231
6.3.3 Optimal Sales with Both Adverse Selection and
Moral Hazard 231
6.4 Summary and Literature Notes 233
Partn STATIC MULTILATERAL CONTRACTING 237
7 Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and
Auctions 239
7.1 Introduction 239
7.2 Bilateral Trading 243
7.2.1 The Two-Type Case 243
7.2.2 Continuum of Types 250
7.3 Auctions with Perfectly Known Values 261
7.3.1 Optimal Efficient Auctions with Independent Values 262
7.3.2 Optimal Auctions with Independent Values 265
7.3.3 Standard Auctions with Independent Values 267
7.3.4 Optimal Independent-Value Auctions with a
Continuum of Types: The Revenue Equivalence
Theorem 271
7.3.5 Optimal Auctions with Correlated Values 276
7.3.6 The Role of Risk Aversion 278
7.3.7 The Role of Asymmetrically Distributed Valuations 280
7.4 Auctions with Imperfectly Known Common Values 282
7.4.1 The Winner's Curse 283
7.4.2 Standard Auctions with Imperfectly Known
Common Values in the 2 x 2 Model 285
7.4.3 Optimal Auctions with Imperfectly Known
Common Values 288
7.5 Summary 290
7.6 Literature Notes 292
7.7 Appendix: Breakdown of Revenue Equivalence in a 2 x 3
Example 294
8 Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion 297
8.1 Moral Hazard in Teams and Tournaments 299
8.1.1 Unobservable Individual Outputs: The Need for a
Budget Breaker 301
ix Contents
8.1.2 Unobservable Individual Outputs: Using Output
Observations to Implement the First Best 305
8.1.3 Observable Individual Outputs 311
8.1.4 Tournaments 316
8.2 Cooperation or Competition among Agents 326
8.2.1 Incentives to Help in Multiagent Situations 326
8.2.2 Cooperation and Collusion among Agents 331
8.3 Supervision and Collusion 338
8.3.1 Collusion with Hard Information 338
8.3.2 Application: Auditing 342
8.4 Hierarchies 351
8.5 Summary 360
8.6 Literature Notes 362
Part ID REPEATED BILATERAL CONTRACTING 365
9 Dynamic Adverse Selection 367
9.1 Dynamic Adverse Selection with Fixed Types 367
9.1.1 Coasian Dynamics 369
9.1.2 Insurance and Renegotiation 379
9.1.3 Soft Budget Constraints 384
9.1.4 Regulation 388
9.2 Repeated Adverse Selection: Changing Types 396
9.2.1 Banking and Liquidity Transformation 397
9.2.2 Optimal Contracting with Two Independent
Shocks 402
9.2.3 Second-Best Risk Sharing between Infinitely
Lived Agents 408
9.3 Summary and Literature Notes 415
10 Dynamic Moral Hazard 419
10.1 The Two-Period Problem 420
10.1.1 No Access to Credit 422
10.1.2 Monitored Savings 426
10.1.3 Free Savings and Asymmetric Information 429
10.2 The T-period Problem: Simple Contracts and the Gains
from Enduring Relations 431
x Contents
10.2.1 Repeated Output
10.2.2 Repeated Actions
10.2.3 Repeated Actions and Output
10.2.4 Infinitely Repeated Actions, Output, and
Consumption
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation
10.3.1 Renegotiation When Effort Is Not Observed by
the Principal
10.3.2 Renegotiation When Effort Is Observed by the
Principal
Bilateral Relational Contracts
10.4.1 Moral Hazard
10.4.2 Adverse Selection
10.4.3 Extensions
Implicit Incentives and Career Concerns
10.5.1 The Single-Task Case
10.5.2 The Multitask Case
10.5.3 The Trade-Off between Talent Risk and Incentives
under Career Concerns
Summary
Literature Notes
Part IV INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS 487
11 Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design 489
11.1 Introduction: Incomplete Contracts and the Employment
Relation 489
11.1.1 The Employment Relation 490
11.1.2 A Theory of the Employment Relation Based on
Ex Post Opportunism 491
11.2 Ownership and the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm 498
11.2.1 A General Framework with Complementary
Investments 500
11.2.2 A Framework with Substitutable Investments 515
11.3 Financial Structure and Control 521
11.3.1 Wealth Constraints and Contingent Allocations of
Control 523
Contents
11.3.2 Wealth Constraints and Optimal Debt Contracts
when Entrepreneurs Can Divert Cash Flow 534
11.4 Summary 549
11.5 Literature Notes 551
Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information 553
12.1 Introduction 553
12.2 Nash and Subgame-Perfect Implementation 555
12.2.1 Nash Implementation: Maskin's Theorem 555
12.2.2 Subgame-Perfect Implementation 558
12.3 The Holdup Problem 560
12.3.1 Specific Performance Contracts and Renegotiation
Design 563
12.3.2 Option Contracts and Contracting at Will 566
12.3.3 Direct Externalities 570
12.3.4 Complexity 572
12.4 Ex Post Unverifiable Actions 578
12.4.1 Financial Contracting 579
12.4.2 Formal and Real Authority 585
12.5 Ex Post Unverifiable Payoffs 588
12.5.1 The Spot-Contracting Mode 591
12.5.2 The Employment Relation and Efficient Authority 594
12.6 Summary and Literature Notes 597
Markets and Contracts 601
13.1 (Static) Adverse Selection: Market Breakdown and
Existence Problems 601
13.1.1 The Case of a Single Contract 602
13.1.2 The Case of Multiple Contracts 604
13.2 Contracts as a Barrier to Entry 606
13.3 Competition with Bilateral Nonexclusive Contracts in the
Presence of Externalities 609
13.3.1 The Simultaneous Offer Game 614
13.3.2 The Sequential Offer Game 623
13.3.3 The Bidding Game: Common Agency and Menu
Auctions 628
13.4 Principal-Agent Pairs 630
xii Contents
13.5 Competition as an Incentive Scheme 636
13.6 Summary and Literature Notes 641
APPENDIX 645
14 Exercises 647
References 687
Author Index 709
Subject Index 715
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robcop 发表于 2010-10-8 12:51:59 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
感谢楼主,不过是不是太贵了点? 是否可以考虑薄利多销?

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gssdzc 在职认证  发表于 2010-10-8 12:53:29 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
i agree this idea. hehe

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jason72 发表于 2010-10-8 14:52:51 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
是整本书吗?希望有个介绍啊。

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ljzx 发表于 2010-10-8 15:35:45 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
整本书,正式出版的

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ljzx 发表于 2010-10-8 15:37:35 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
不是扫描版

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Brdic 发表于 2010-10-8 15:52:03 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
好书 就是有点贵啊!

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xzguan 发表于 2010-10-8 16:00:41 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
不错,顶一下。

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benji427 在职认证  发表于 2010-10-9 07:48:05 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
好书是好书 就是太贵了 谢谢了

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SepLost 发表于 2010-10-9 12:43:52 |显示全部楼层 |坛友微信交流群
非常谢谢楼主.这本书还是很重要的

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