Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection |
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文献名称 | Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection | ||||||
文献作者 | Joseph P. Newhouse | ||||||
作者所在单位 | 哈佛大学 | ||||||
文献分类 | 已发表文献 | ||||||
学科一级分类 | 经济 | ||||||
学科二级分类 | 卫生经济学 | ||||||
文献摘要 |
The tradeoff between an insurer's or medical provider's incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply-price analog to the demand-price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion. Under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee-for-service payments. Empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon. The presence of contracting costs in a Rothschild-Stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome. |
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参考文献 | |||||||
关键字 | incentives moral hazard risk aversion | ||||||
发表所在刊物(或来源) | Journal of Economic Literature,Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 1236-1263 | ||||||
发表时间 | Sep., 1996 | ||||||
适用研究领域 | |||||||
评论 | |||||||
上传时间 | 2011-2-21 15:26 | ||||||
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