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Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection

文献名称 Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production Versus Selection
文献作者 Joseph P. Newhouse
作者所在单位 哈佛大学
文献分类 已发表文献
学科一级分类 经济
学科二级分类 卫生经济学
文献摘要 The tradeoff between an insurer's or medical provider's incentives to select good risks and to produce efficiently is governed by the supply-price analog to the demand-price tradeoff between moral hazard and risk aversion. Under a variety of models the optimum supply price is a mixture of capitation and fee-for-service payments. Empirical literature shows that pure capitation payment leaves strong incentives for selection that are acted upon. The presence of contracting costs in a Rothschild-Stiglitz model means a limited pooling equilibrium can exist and that poor risks will not be at their preferred outcome.
参考文献
关键字 incentives moral hazard risk aversion
发表所在刊物(或来源) Journal of Economic Literature,Vol. 34, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 1236-1263
发表时间 Sep., 1996
适用研究领域
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