当代经济学系列丛书 策略博弈论导论[美]乔尔.沃森 著，费方域 赖丹馨 等译.

(中文版因含有广告，并且只有少量几页中文，故删除。暂缺，待补。)为弥补本人失误，本资源免费。回复即可免费下载


Strategy An Introduction to Game Theory(策略-博弈论导论) by JOEL WATSON



PREFACE xiii
1 INTRODUCTION 1
Noncooperative Game Theory 3
Contract and Cooperative Game Theory 4
The Meaning of “Game” 5
PART I: REPRESENTATIONS AND BASIC ASSUMPTIONs 7
2 THE EXTENSIVE FORM 9
Other Examples and Conventions 15
Guided Exercise 17
Exercises 18
3 Strate gies and the normal form22
Terminology and Notation for Strategies 23
The Normal Form 26
Classic Normal-Form Games 28
Interpretation of the Normal Form 30
Guided Exercise 31
Exercises 33
4 BELIEFS, MIXED STRATEGIES, AND EXPECTED PAYOFFS 37
Guided Exercise 39
Exercises 40
5 G ENERAL ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 42
Rationality 43
Common Knowledge 44
Overview of Solution Concepts 45
The Issue of Realism 46
PART II: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN STATIC SETTINGS 47
6 DOMINANCE AND BEST RESPONSE 49
Dominance 49
The First Strategic Tension and the Prisoners’ Dilemma 52
The Concept of Efficiency 53
Best Response 54
Dominance and Best Response Compared 57
Weak Dominance 60
Guided Exercise 61
Exercises 63
7 RATIONALIZABILITY AND ITERATED DOMINANCE 67
The Second Strategic Tension 71
Guided Exercise 73
Exercises 74
8 LOCATION, PARTNERSHIP, AND SOCIAL UNREST 78
A Location Game 78
A Partnership Game: Strategic Complementarities 81
Social Unrest 87
Guided Exercise 90
Exercises 91
9 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 95
Nash Equilibrium 97
Equilibrium of the Partnership Game 100
Coordination and Social Welfare 101
The Third Strategic Tension 104
Congruous Sets 104
Aside: Experimental Game Theory 106
Guided Exercise 107
Exercises 108
10 OLIGOPOLY, TARIFFS, CRIME, AND VOTING 113
Cournot Duopoly Model 113
Bertrand Duopoly Model 115
Tariff Setting by Two Countries 117
A Model of Crime and Police 118
The Median Voter Theorem 118
Strategic Voting 120
Guided Exercise 123
Exercises 124
11 MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM 132
Randomization in Sports 135
Technical Notes 136
Example: Duopoly with Capacity Constraints 137
Guided Exercise 140
Exercises 140
12 STRICTLY COMPETITIVE GAMES AND
SECURITY STRATEGIES 148
Guided Exercise 151
Exercises 152
13 CONTRACT, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT
IN STATIC SETTINGS 154
Complete Contracting in Discretionary Environments 158
Contracting with Court-Imposed Breach Remedies 161
Guided Exercise 166
Exercises 167
PART III: ANALYZING BEHAVIOR IN DYNAMIC SETTINGS 173
14 DETAILS OF THE EXTENSIVE FORM 175
Recalling the Strategy Definition 179
Guided Exercise 180
Exercises 181
15 SEQUENTIAL RATIONALITY AND SUBGAME PERFECTION 183
Incredible Threats in the Stackelberg Duopoly Game 184
Sequential Rationality 185
Backward Induction 186
Subgame Perfection 188
The SPE of the Stackelberg Duopoly Game 191
Technical Notes 192
Conditional Dominance and Forward Induction 195
Guided Exercise 198
Exercises 199
16 TOPICS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 204
Advertising and Competition 204
A Model of Limit Capacity 206
Dynamic Monopoly 209
Price Guarantees as a Commitment to High Prices 213
Dynamic Price Competition with Capacity Constraints 215
Guided Exercise 217
Exercises 219
17 PARLOR GAMES 224
Guided Exercise 226
Exercises 226
18 BARGAINING PROBLEMS 230
Bargaining: Value Creation and Division 230
An Abstract Representation of Bargaining Problems 232
An Example 234
The Standard Bargaining Solution 236
A Note About Legal Default Rules 238
Guided Exercise 240
Exercises 241
19 ANALYSIS OF SIMPLE BARGAINING GAMES 244
Ultimatum Games: Power to the Proposer 244
Two-Period, Alternating-Offer Games: Power to the Patient 246
Infinite-Period, Alternating-Offer Game 250
Multilateral Bargaining 251
Guided Exercise 254
Exercises 255
20 GAMES WITH JOINT DECISIONS;
NEGOTIATION EQUILIBRIUM 259
Joint Decisions 260
Negotiation Equilibrium 262
Example: Contracting for High-Powered Incentives 263
Guided Exercise 265
Exercises 267
21 UNVERIFIABLE INVESTMENT, HOLD UP, OPTIONS,
AND OWNERSHIP 274
Hold-Up Example 275
Up-Front Contracting and Option Contracts 278
Asset Ownership 281
Guided Exercise 283
Exercises 285
22 REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATION 291
A Two-Period Repeated Game 292
An Infinitely Repeated Game 297
The Equilibrium Payoff Set with Low Discounting 302
Guided Exercise 306
Exercises 307
23 COLLUSION, TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND GOODWILL 311
Dynamic Oligopoly and Collusion 311
Enforcing International Trade Agreements 313
Goodwill and Trading a Reputation 314
Guided Exercise 317
Exercises 318
PART IV: INFORMATION 325
24 RANDOM EVENTS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 327
Guided Exercise 331
Exercises 332
25 RISK AND INCENTIVES IN CONTRACTING 336
Risk Aversion 336
A Principal–Agent Game 340
Guided Exercise 345
Exercises 346
26 BAYESIAN NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALIZABILITY 350
Guided Exercise 353
Exercises 354
27 LEMONS, AUCTIONS, AND INFORMATION AGGREGATION 360
Markets and Lemons 360
Auctions 363
Information Aggregation 368
Guided Exercise 373
Exercises 374
28 PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM 378
Conditional Beliefs about Types 379
Sequential Rationality 380
Consistency of Beliefs 381
Equilibrium Definition 382
Guided Exercise 384
Exercises 386
29 JOB-MARKET SIGNALING AND REPUTAtION 392
Jobs and School 392
Reputation and Incomplete Information 395
Guided Exercise 398
Exercises 400
APPENDICES 407
INDEX 477



[hide][/hide]