PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK

以下摘自原书的序

“This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its importantnewapplications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of “optimal auctions” and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations

of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze asmuchrevenue as possible fromthe fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation. It shows how seemingly different auction designs can lead to nearly identical outcomes if the participating bidders are the same – a finding that focuses attention on (1) attracting bidders and (2) minimizing the cost of running the auction and bidding in it. It shows hownewauction designs can accommodate complicated procurement settings and sales with many interrelated goods."

这是一本关于Auction（拍卖）的经典经济学著作。对博弈论，拍卖等感兴趣的同学值得看一下。

非扫描版本。是电子书。很清晰。每一章节都有索引。