【2013】 Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge

Book 图书名称： Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge
Author 作者： Julia Tanney
Publisher 出版社： Harvard University Press
Page 页数： 378
Publishing Date 出版时间： Jan 8, 2013
Language 语言： English
Size 大小： 2 MB
Format 格式： pdf 文字版
ISBN: 0674067088, 9780674067080
Edition: 第1版 搜索过论坛，没有该文档


Julia Tanney offers a sustained criticism of today’s canon in philosophy of mind, which conceives the workings of the rational mind as the outcome of causal interactions between mental states that have their bases in the brain. With its roots in physicalism and functionalism, this widely accepted view provides the philosophical foundation for the cardinal tenet of the cognitive sciences: that cognition is a form of information-processing. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge presents a challenge not only to the cognitivist approach that has dominated philosophy and the special sciences for the last fifty years but, more broadly, to metaphysical-empirical approaches to the study of the mind.



Responding to a tradition that owes much to the writings of Davidson, early Putnam, and Fodor, Tanney challenges this orthodoxy on its own terms. In untangling its internal inadequacies, starting with the paradoxes of irrationality, she arrives at a view these philosophers were keen to rebut—one with affinities to the work of Ryle and Wittgenstein and all but invisible to those working on the cutting edge of analytic philosophy and mind research today. This is the view that rational explanations are embedded in “thick” descriptions that are themselves sophistications upon ever ascending levels of discourse, or socio-linguistic practices.



Tanney argues that conceptual cartography rather than metaphysical-scientific explanation is the basic tool for understanding the nature of the mind. Rules, Reason, and Self-Knowledge clears the path for a return to the world-involving, circumstance-dependent, normative practices where the rational mind has its home.

== Table of contents ==
Introduction
I. Rules and Normativity
1. De-Individualizing Norms of Rationality (1995)
2. Normativity and Thought (1999)
3. Playing the Rule-Following Game (2000)
4. Real Rules (2008)
II. Reason-Explanation and Mental Causation
5. Why Reasons May Not Be Causes (1995)
6. Reason-Explanation and the Contents of the Mind (2005)
7. Reasons as Non-Causal, Context-Placing Explanations (2009)
8. Pain, Polio, and Pride: Some Reflections on “Becausal” Explanations
III. Philosophical Elucidation and Cognitive Science
9. How to Resist Mental Representations (1998)
10. On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other “Behaviorally Indistinguishable” Creatures (2004)
11. Conceptual Analysis, Theory Construction, and Philosophical Elucidation in the Philosophy of Mind
12. Ryle’s Regress and the Philosophy of Cognitive Science (2011)
IV. Self-Knowledge
13. Some Constructivist Thoughts about Self-Knowledge (1996)
14. Self-Knowledge, Normativity, and Construction (2002)
15. Speaking One’s Mind (2007)
16. Conceptual Amorphousness, Reasons, and Causes
Acknowledgments
Provenance of Essays
Index


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