<LI><B>完整书名</B>: Foreign Direct Investment:Analysis of Aggregate Flows
<LI><B>完整作者名</B>: Assaf Razin， Efraim Sadka
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<DIV id=postmessage_150755 class=t_msgfont>阿沙夫·拉辛(Assaf Razin)，以色列特拉维夫大学公共经济学马里奥·亨里奎讲座教授，美国国家经济研究局研究员，伦敦经济政策中心的特别研究员。合著有《世界经济中的财政政策与增长》、《人口经济学》、《国际税收》等。:埃弗瑞·萨德卡(Efraim Sadka)，以色列特拉维夫大学国际资本市场亨利·考夫曼讲座教授。<BR></DIV>
<P>目录</P>
<P>Contents<BR>Preface xiii<BR>1 Overview 1<BR>1.1 Channels of International Capital Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . 2<BR>1.2 Micro Level Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4<BR>1.3 Macro-Finance Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6<BR>1.4 Scope and Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9<BR>1.4.1 Bilateral FDI Flows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11<BR>1.4.2 Roadmap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12<BR>I A Theory of FDI with Threshold Barriers 19<BR>2 Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment 21<BR>2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21<BR>2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27<BR>2.2.1 Management and E&cent; ciency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28<BR><BR><BR>2.2.2 Liquidity Shocks and Resale Prices . . . . . . . . . . . 30<BR>2.3 Ex-Ante Choice between FDI and FPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34<BR>2.3.1 Expected Value of FDI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34<BR>2.3.2 Expected Value of FPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35<BR>2.3.3 FDI and FPI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36<BR>2.4 Market Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38<BR>2.4.1 The Allocation of Investors between FDI and FPI . . . 38<BR>2.4.2 The Probability of Early Withdrawals . . . . . . . . . 42<BR>2.4.3 Welfare Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43<BR>2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46<BR>Appendix 2A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47<BR>3 Foreign versus Domestic Direct Investment: Cream-Skimming 57<BR>3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57<BR>3.2 FDI and Skimming High-Productivity Firms . . . . . . . . . . 59<BR>3.3 FPI In‡ows Versus FDI In‡ows . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66<BR>3.3.1 Gains to the Host Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67<BR>3.3.2 The Size of Investment in Capacity in the Host Country 70<BR>3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71<BR>4 FDI Flows with Endogenous DomesticWages: Heterogenous<BR>Firms 77<BR>4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77<BR>4.2 Wage Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78<BR><BR>4.3 M&amp;A and Green…eld Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82<BR>4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87<BR>Appendix 4A.1: Some Comparable Statics Derivations . . . . . . . 88<BR>Appendix 4A.2: Reconciliation of the International Flow Paradox<BR>according to Lucas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91<BR>5 Country-Speci…c Aggregate Shocks: Representative Firm 95<BR>5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95<BR>5.2 Country-Speci…c Productivity Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96<BR>5.3 The Con‡icting E¤ects of the Source- and Host-Country Pro-<BR>ductivity Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99<BR>5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105<BR>II The Econometric Approach 107<BR>6 Overview of the Econometric Equations 109<BR>6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109<BR>6.2 The Heckman Selection Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110<BR>6.3 The Tobit Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115<BR>6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116<BR>7 Application to a Base-Line Sample: OLS, Tobit and the<BR>Heckman Selection Model 119<BR>7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119<BR><BR>7.2 Data and Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120<BR>7.3 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121<BR>7.4 Evidence for Fixed Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125<BR>7.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126<BR>III Empirical Applications 129<BR>8 Productivity Shocks 131<BR>8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131<BR>8.2 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133<BR>8.3 Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134<BR>8.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139<BR>9 Source and Host Corporate Tax Rates 143<BR>9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143<BR>9.2 Source and Host Taxation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145<BR>9.3 Empirical Evidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148<BR>9.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152<BR>Appendix 9A: Basic Principles of International Taxation of Capital<BR>Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153<BR>IV Policy in a Globalized Economy 161<BR>10 Tax Competition and Coordination 163<BR><BR>10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163<BR>10.2 A Source-Host Country Model of Taxes and Public Goods . . 165<BR>10.2.1 Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165<BR>10.2.2 Private Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168<BR>10.2.3 Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171<BR>10.3 Tax Competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172<BR>10.4 Tax Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175<BR>10.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177<BR></P>
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<P align=right><FONT color=#000066>[此贴子已经被squarekiss于2008-7-30 16:48:29编辑过]</FONT></P></LI>