<font color="#4169e1" size="6">[标题]30金钱求助保险业英文书籍一本.<br/>【书名】：Handbook of Insurance<br/>【作者】：Georges Dionne<br/>【出版商 】：Kluwer Academic Publishers<br/>【出版日期 】：2000<br/>[ISBN]0-7923-7870-9<br/></font><font color="#ff0000"><font size="7">备注:如有兄弟能提供可编辑清晰电子版本,另补20金钱作为酬谢哈。springer数据库上貌似有这本书。但本人下不下来.</font></font><br/><br/>部门目录如下<img alt="" src="http://bbs.jjxj.org/images/smilies/default/sad.gif" border="0" smilieid="2"/>完整目录见后面附件)<br/><br/>Table of Contents<br/>Table of Contents<br/>Contributing Authors<br/>Referees<br/>PREFACE<br/>Denis Kessler<br/>INTRODUCTION<br/>Georges Dionne<br/>PART 1 : HISTORY<br/>Chapter 1<br/>Developments in Risk and Insurance Economics: the Past 25 Years<br/>Henri Loubergé<br/>Introduction<br/>Insurance economics in 1973<br/>Developments<br/>New approaches: finance and insurance<br/>Conclusion<br/>PART 2 : INSURANCE THEORY WITHOUT INFORMATION PROBLEMS<br/>Chapter 2<br/>Non-Expected Utility and the Robustness of the Classical Insurance Paradigm<br/>Mark J. Machina<br/>Introduction<br/>Non-expected utility preferences and generalized expected utility analysis<br/>Individual demand for insurance<br/>Pareto-efficient bilateral insurance contracts<br/>Pareto-efficient multilateral risk sharing<br/>Self-insurance versus self-protection<br/>Outcome kinks and first order risk aversion<br/>Extensions and limits of robustness<br/>Insurance as a source of non-expected utility preferences<br/>Conclusion<br/>Chapter 3<br/>Optimal Insurance Design: What Can We Do With and Without Expected Utility?<br/>Christian Gollier<br/>Introduction<br/>The basic framework<br/>The case of linear transaction costs<br/>Nonlinear transaction costs<br/>Other reasons for partial insurance<br/>Conclusion<br/>Chapter 4<br/>The Effects of Changes in Risk on Risk Taking: A Survey<br/>Christian Gollier and Louis Eeckhoudt<br/>Introduction<br/>A simple model<br/>Detrimental changes in risk<br/>The comparative statics of changes in the controllable risk<br/>The comparative statics of background risk<br/>Extensions<br/>Conclusion<br/>Chapter 5<br/>The Theory of Insurance Demand<br/>Harris Schlesinger<br/>Introduction<br/>The singe risk model<br/>The model with multiple risks<br/>Concluding remarks<br/>PART 3 : ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION : THEORY<br/>Chapter 6<br/>Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazard<br/>Ralph Winter<br/>Introduction<br/>The simplest model<br/>Self-protection and uncertain losses<br/>Loss reduction and moral hazard<br/>General assumptions on the distribution of losses<br/>Extensions<br/><br/><br/>