<p>Table of contents<br/>INTRODUCTION - Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley</p><p>SECTION I: THE DOMAIN OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS</p><p>Ch.1: Institutions and the Performance of Economies over Time - Douglass C. North, Washington University in St. Louis Ch.2: The Institutional Structure of Production - Ronald Coase, the University of Chicago Ch.3: Transaction Cost Economics - Oliver E. Williamson, University of California at Berkeley </p><p>SECTION II : POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE STATE</p><p>Ch.4: Electoral Institutions and Political Competition: Coordination, Persuasion and Mobilization - Gary Cox, University of California at San Diego Ch.5: Presidential versus Parliamentary Government - John Carey, Washington University in St. Louis Ch.6: Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle - Matthew McCubbins, University of California at San Diego Ch.7: The Performance and Stability of Federalism: An Institutional Perspective - Barry Weingast, Stanford University </p><p>SECTION III : LEGAL INSTITUTIONS OF A MARKET ECONOMY</p><p>Ch.8: The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments - Gillian K. Hadfield, University of Southern California Ch.9: Legal Systems as Frameworks for Market Exchanges - Paul Rubin, Emory University Ch.10: Market Institutions and Judicial Rulemaking - Benito Arrunada and Veneta Andonova, Pompeu Fabra Ch.11: Legal Institutions and Financial Development - Thorsten Beck, the World Bank and Ross Levine, University of Minnesota</p><p>SECTION IV: MODES OF GOVERNANCE </p><p>Ch.12: The New Institutional Approach to Organization - Claude Menard, University of Paris- Pantheon Sorbonne Ch. 13: Vertical Integration - Paul Joskow, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Ch. 14: Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems in Firms - Gary Miller, Washington University in St. Louis Ch. 15: The Institutions of Corporate Governance - Mark Roe, Harvard Ch. 16: Firms and the Creation of New Markets - Erin Anderson and Hubert Gatignon, INSEAD</p><p>SECTION V: CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS</p><p>Ch. 17: The Make or Buy Decisions: Lessons from Empirical Studies - Peter Klein, University of Missouri Ch. 18: Agricultural Contracts - Douglas Allen, Simon Fraser University and Dean Lueck, Montana State University Ch.19: The Enforcement of Contracts and Private Ordering - Victor Goldberg, Columbia University </p><p>SECTION VI : REGULATION</p><p>Ch.20 : The Institutions of Regulation. An Application to Public Utilities. - Pablo Spiller, University of California at Berkeley and Mario Tommasi, University of San Andres Ch.21: State Regulation of Open-Access, Common-Pool Resources - Gary Libecap, University of Arizona Ch.22: Property Rights, and the State - Lee Alston, University of Colorado and Bernardo Mueller, University of Brasilia Ch.23: Licit and Illicit Firm Responses to Public Regulation -Lee Benham, Washington University in St. Louis</p><p>SECTION VII: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE</p><p>Ch.24: Institutions and Development - Mary M. Shirley, The World Bank and Ronald Coase Institute Ch.25: - Institutional and Non-Institutional Explanation of Economic Differences Stanley L. Engerman, University of Rochester and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, University of California at Los Angeles Ch.26: Institutions and Firms in Transition Economies - Peter Murrell, University of Maryland Ch.27: Social Capital, Social Norms and the New Institutional Economics- Philip Keefer and Steve Knack, The World Bank Ch.28: Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange - Avner Greif, Stanford University </p><p>SECTION VIII: PERSPECTIVES</p><p>Ch.29: Economic Sociology and New Institutional Economics - Victor Nee and Richard Swedberg, Cornell Ch.30: Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper than Markets and Hierarchies - Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University </p><p></p>

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