[UseMoney=8]国外关于IPO定价的文献:
1.Global Trends in IPO Methods： Book Building vsAuctions with Endogenous Entry
＜Global Trends in IPO Methods：Book Building vs. Auctions with Endogenous Entry＞内容详细介绍
The U.S. book building method has become increasingly popular for initial public offerings (IPOs) worldwide over the last decade, whereas sealed bid IPO auctions have been abandoned in nearly all of the many countries in which they have been tried. I model book building, discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions in an environment where the number of investors and the accuracy of investors' information are endogenous. Book building lets underwriters manage investor access to shares, allowing them to: 1) reduce risk for both issuers and investors; and 2) control spending on information acquisition, thereby limiting either underpricing or aftermarket volatility. Since more control and less risk are beneficial to all issuers, the advantages of book building’s allocational flexibility may explain why global patterns of issuer choice are surprisingly consistent. My models also predict that offerings with higher expected underpricing will have lower expected aftermarket volatility; that an auction open to large numbers of potential bidders is vulnerable to inaccurate pricing and to fluctuations in the number of bidders; and that both book built and auctioned IPOs will exhibit partial adjustment to public information.
2.IPO Underpricing- Issue Mechanisms-and Size
<IPO Underpricing, Issue Mechanisms, and Size>内容详细介绍
This paper studies the pricing of IPOs in the Indian context. The paper also examines whether the introduction of Bookbuilding has an impact on IPO pricing. The results suggest that IPOs are underpriced. The results also suggest that bookbuilt IPOs show less underpricing than fixed price issues. A more detailed study suggests that this has to do more with the size of the issue than the issue process. A model describing the IPO process in the presence of asymmetric information and heterogenous beliefs is presented. This model suggests that IPO underpricing can be avoided in the presence of selectively informed investors. The model includes the choices on signaling cost, homogenous and heterogeneous beliefs among the investors, entrepreneur holding dilution and issue size that exist for a firm while coming for an IPO. The model suggests that a larger amount of money is left on the table if the entrepreneur holds a lesser amount with herself post IPO.
Despite asymmetric information, the high value firm can place an issue without leaving money on the table. The model also suggests that IPO underpricing is unavoidable in a market with information asymmetry and homogenous beliefs among investors. The models predict that underpricing is more severe in the case of smaller issue sizes. This is consistent with the empirical findings.