<p>Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Volume 1<br/>Edited by: Charles R. Plott and Vernon L. Smith<br/>North Holland | 2008-09-15 | ISBN: 9780444826428&nbsp;| 1184 pages </p><p></p><p></p><p><strong>Contents<br/></strong><br/>Introduction to the Series, Page vii, Kenneth J. Arrow, Michael D. Intriligator<br/>Preface, Pages ix-xii<br/>Contents of Volume 1, Pages xiii-xliii<br/><br/>Part 1: Markets<br/>1. Markets, Pages 3-13<br/>Chapter 1 Properties of Disequilibrium Adjustment in Double Auction Markets, Pages 16-21, Charles R. Plott<br/>Part 1.1: Institutional Environments<br/>Part 1.1.1: Properties of the Double Auction<br/>Chapter 2 From Market Jaws to the Newton Method: The Geometry of How a Market Can Solve Systems of Equations, Pages 22-24, Peter Bossaerts, Charles R. Plott<br/>Chapter 3 Exogenous Uncertainty Increases the Bid–Ask Spread in the Continuous Double Auction, Pages 25-30, Vernon L. Smith, Mark Van Boening<br/>Chapter 4 Zero-Intelligence Robots and the Double Auction Market: A Graphical Tour, Pages 31-45, Paul J. Brewer<br/>Chapter 5 Effect of Non-binding Price Controls in Double Auction Trading, Pages 46-53, Vernon L. Smith, Arlington W. Williams<br/>Part 1.1.2: Properties of Posted Offer Processes<br/>Chapter 6 Fairness and Short Run Price Adjustment in Posted Offer Markets, Pages 55-61, Praveen Kujal, Vernon L. Smith<br/>Chapter 7 Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium Predictions as a Means of Organizing Behavior in Posted-Offer Market Experiments, Pages 62-70, Douglas D. Davis, Bart J. Wilson<br/>Chapter 8 Simulated and Real Buyers in Posted Offer Markets, Pages 71-76, Jamie Brown Kruse<br/>Chapter 9 The Performance of Double-Auction and Posted-Offer Markets with Advance Production, Pages 77-82, Stuart Mestelman<br/>Part 1.1.3: Call Markets and Sealed Bids<br/>Chapter 10 Strategy-Proof Equilibrium Behavior in Two-Sided Auctions, Pages 84-91, Vernon L. Smith<br/>Chapter 11 First Price Independent Private Values Auctions, Pages 92-98, James C. Cox<br/>Part 1.1.4: Alternative Market Institutions<br/>Chapter 12 The Walrasian Auction, Pages 100-108, Corinne Bronfman, Kevin McCabe, David Porter, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith<br/>Chapter 13 The Matching Market Institution, Pages 109-114, Daniel Friedman, Changhua Rich<br/>Chapter 14 Tatonnement, Pages 115-117, Charles R. Plott<br/>Part 1.2: Imperfect Competition<br/>Part 1.2.1: Market Power<br/>Chapter 15 Wage Differentials in Experimental Efficiency Wage Markets, Pages 120-126, Ernst Fehr, Simon G&auml;chter<br/>Chapter 16 The Paradox of Power, Pages 127-137, Yvonne Durham, Jack Hirshleifer, Vernon L. Smith<br/>Chapter 17 The Exercise of Market Power in Laboratory Experiments, Pages 138-145, Douglas D. Davis, Charles A. Holt<br/>Chapter 18 The Classical Experiments on Cournot Oligopoly, Pages 146-152, Antoni Bosch-Domènech, Nicolaas J. Vriend<br/>Chapter 19 Experiments in Decentralized Monopoly Restraint, Pages 153-162, James C. Cox, R. Mark Isaac<br/>Part 1.2.2: Collusion<br/>Chapter 20 Price Signaling and “Cheap Talk” in Laboratory Posted Offer Markets, Pages 164-169, Timothy N. Cason<br/>Chapter 21 The Effects of Collusion in Laboratory Experiments, Pages 170-177, ouglas D. Davis, Charles A. Holt<br/>Chapter 22 Predatory Pricing: Rare Like a Unicorn?, Pages 178-184, Rosario Gomez, Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt<br/>Chapter 23 Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions, Pages 185-198, Katerina Sherstyuk<br/>Part 1.2.3: Non-Convexities<br/>Chapter 24 Non-Convexities, Economies of Scale, Natural Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition, Pages 200-205, Charles R. Plott<br/>Chapter 25 Avoidable Cost Structures and Competitive Market Institutions, Pages 206-212, Mark V. Boening, Nathaniel T. Wilcox<br/>Part 1.3: Dynamics of Market Adjustments<br/>Chapter 26 Principles of Market Adjustment and Stability, Pages 214-227, Charles R. Plott<br/>Chapter 27 Off-floor Trading, Market Disintegration and Price Volatility in Bid/Ask Markets, Pages 228-233, Vernon L. Smith, Mark Van Boening<br/>Chapter 28 Quantitative Restrictions in Experimental Posted-offer Markets, Pages 234-241, Praveen Kujal<br/>Chapter 29 Price Bubbles in Large Financial Asset Markets, Pages 242-246, Arlington W. Williams<br/>Chapter 30 Price Bubbles, Pages 247-255, David Porter, Vernon L. Smith<br/>Chapter 31 Experiments with Arbitrage Across Assets, Pages 256-259, Eric O'N. Fisher<br/>Chapter 32 Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset Markets: Common Knowledge Failure?, Pages 260-263, Charles Noussair, Charles Plott<br/>Chapter 33 A Comparison of Market Institutions, Pages 264-272, Timothy N. Cason, Daniel Friedman<br/>Chapter 34 Coordination Success in Non-cooperative Large Group Market Entry Games, Pages 273-295, Amnon Rapoport, Darryl A. Seale<br/><br/>Part 2: Market Economics of Uncertainty and Information<br/>2. Market Economics of Uncertainty and Information, Pages 299-302<br/>Chapter 35 Learning to Forecast Rationally, Pages 303-310, Hugh Kelley, Daniel Friedman<br/>Chapter 36 Laboratory Tests of Job Search Models, Pages 311-318, James C. Cox, Ronald L. Oaxaca<br/>Chapter 37 Reciprocity and Contract Enforcement, Pages 319-324, Simon G&auml;chter, Ernst Fehr<br/>Chapter 38 Reciprocity in Experimental Markets, Pages 325-334, Ernst Fehr, Armin Falk<br/>Chapter 39 Information Cascade Experiments, Pages 335-343, Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt<br/>Chapter 40 Markets and Information Aggregation Mechanisms, Pages 344-352, Kay-Yut Chen, Charles R. Plott<br/><br/>Part 3: General Equilibrium and the Economics of Multiple Market Systems<br/>3. General Equilibrium and Multiple Market Systems, Pages 355-357<br/>Chapter 41 Comparative Advantage and International Trade, Pages 358-363, Charles R. Plott<br/>Chapter 42 Asset Pricing, Pages 364-369, Peter Bossaerts<br/>Chapter 43 Price Discovery and Allocation in Chains and Networks of Markets, Pages 370-375, Charles R. Plott, Jackie Yeung<br/>Chapter 44 Multiple Market Systems and the Classical Principles of Price Dynamics in General Equilibrium, Pages 376-383, Charles R. Plott<br/><br/>Part 4: Games<br/>4. Games, Pages 387-389<br/>Part 4.1: Accuracy of the Nash Model<br/>Chapter 45 Experimental Beauty Contest Games: Levels of Reasoning and Convergence to Equilibrium, Pages 391-410, Rosemarie Nagel<br/>Chapter 46 Reciprocity in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: An Introduction, Pages 411-416, Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Vernon Smith<br/>Chapter 47 Preferences and Property Rights in Ultimatum and Dictator Games, Pages 417-422, Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Vernon Smith<br/>Chapter 48 Prompting Strategic Reasoning Increases Other-regarding Behavior, Pages 423-428, Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Vernon Smith<br/>Chapter 49 Social Distance and Reciprocity in Dictator Games, Pages 429-435, Elizabeth Hoffman, Kevin McCabe, Vernon Smith<br/>Chapter 50 Fairness in Ultimatum Bargaining, Pages 436-453, J. Keith Murnighan<br/>Chapter 51 Coordination Failure in Market Statistic Games, Pages 454-462, John Van Huyck, Raymond Battalio<br/>Chapter 52 The Problem of Common Choice in Symmetric N-person Coordination Games, Pages 463-471, Carl M. Rhodes, Rick K. Wilson<br/>Chapter 53 Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games, Pages 472-480, Nicole Bouchez, Daniel Friedman<br/>Chapter 54 Analyzing Choice with Revealed Preference: Is Altruism Rational?, Pages 481-487, James Andreoni, John H. Miller<br/>Chapter 55 Testing Theories of Other-regarding Behavior: A Sequence of Four Laboratory Studies, Pages 488-499, Gary E. Bolton, Jordi Brandts, Elena Katok, Axel Ockenfels, Rami Zwick<br/>Chapter 56 Focal Points and Bargaining, Pages 500-507, Ken Binmore, Joseph Swierzbinski<br/>Chapter 57 Differences in the Economic Decisions of Men and Women: Experimental Evidence, Pages 509-519, Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman<br/>Chapter 58 Emergent Conventions in Evolutionary Games, Pages 520-530, John Van Huyck<br/>Chapter 59 Self-centered Fairness in Games with More Than Two Players, Pages 531-540, Gary E. Bolton, Axel Ockenfels<br/>Chapter 60 Quantal Response Equilibria: A Brief Synopsis, Pages 541-548, Richard D. McKelvey, Thomas R. Palfrey<br/>Chapter 61 Logit Equilibrium Models of Anomalous Behavior: What to do when the Nash Equilibrium Says One Thing and the Data Say Something Else, Pages 549-558, Simon P. Anderson, Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt<br/>Part 4.3: Learning in Games<br/>Chapter 62 Asymmetric Two-person Bargaining Under Incomplete Information: Strategic Play and Adaptive Learning, Pages 560-571, Amnon Rapoport, Terry E. Daniel, Darryl A. Seale<br/>Chapter 63 The Effect of Message Space Size on Learning and Outcomes in Sender–Receiver Games, Pages 572-584, Andreas Blume, Douglas V. DeJong, Geoffrey B. Sprinkle<br/>Chapter 64 Learning in Entry Limit Pricing Games, Pages 585-597, David J. Cooper<br/>Chapter 65 Payoff Uncertainty and Cooperation in Finitely-repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games, Pages 598-606, Lawrence M. Kahn, J. Keith Murnighan<br/>Chapter 66 Learning and Equilibrium in Games, Pages 607-615, Colin F. Camerer, Teck H. Ho, Juin-Kuan Chong<br/><br/>Part 5: Mechanism Design and Policy Applications<br/>5. Mechanism Design and Policy Applications, Pages 619-623<br/>Part 5.1: Abstract, Theory Driven<br/>Chapter 67 Incentive-compatible Mechanisms for Pure Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, Pages 625-643, Yan Chen<br/>Chapter 68 The Combinatorial Auction, Pages 644-653, Stephen J. Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith<br/>Part 5.2: Applied, Problem Driven<br/>Chapter 69 Share Trading and Coupon Banking Interact to Improve Performance in Emission Trading Markets, Pages 655-660, Stuart Mestelman, R. Andrew Muller<br/>Chapter 70 Trading Institutions and Emission Allowances, Pages 661-668, Timothy N. Cason<br/>Chapter 71 Procurement Contracting, Pages 669-675, James C. Cox, R. Mark Isaac<br/>Chapter 72 Electric Power Market Design Issues and Laboratory Experiments, Pages 676-680, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon Smith<br/>Chapter 73 Energy, Reserve and Adjustment Market Behavior With Industry Network, Demand and Generator Parameters, Pages 681-699, Mark A. Olson, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith<br/>Chapter 74 Transmission Constraints, Incentive Auction Rules and Trader Experience in an Electric Power Market, Pages 700-709, Steven Backerman, Stephen Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith<br/>Chapter 75 A Smart Market for the Spot Pricing and Pricing of Transmission Through a Power Grid, Pages 710-718, Hung-Po Chao, Charles R. Plott<br/>Part 5.3: From the Lab to the Field<br/>Chapter 76 Asset Market Manipulation: A Field Experiment with Racetrack Betting, Pages 720-724, Colin F. Camerer<br/>Chapter 77 Pre-testing International Climate Change Policies: Methods and Results, Pages 725-732, Peter Bohm<br/>Chapter 78 Quasi-experimental Evaluation of Regional Employment Subsidies, Pages 733-735, Peter Bohm<br/>Chapter 79 Field-test Elicitations of Demand for Public Goods, Pages 736-741, Peter Bohm<br/>Chapter 80 Results from a Dozen Years of Election Futures Markets Research, Pages 742-751, Joyce Berg, Robert Forsythe, Forrest Nelson, Thomas Rietz<br/>Chapter 81 Experimental Evidence on the Existence of Hypothetical Bias in Value Elicitation Methods, Pages 752-767, Glenn W. Harrison, E. Elisabet Rutstr&ouml;m<br/><br/>Part 6: Non-Market and Organizational Research<br/>6. Non-market and Organizational Research, Pages 771-774<br/>Part 6.1: Public Goods, Externalities and Common Pools<br/>Chapter 82 Partners versus Strangers: Random Rematching in Public Goods Experiments, Pages 776-783, James Andreoni, Rachel Croson<br/>Chapter 83 Differentiating Altruism and Reciprocity, Pages 784-791, Rachel T.A. Croson<br/>Chapter 84 Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Results with Interior Nash Equilibria, Pages 792-801, Susan K. Laury, Charles A. Holt<br/>Chapter 85 Spiteful Behavior in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism Experiments, Pages 802-816, Tatsuyoshi Saijo<br/>Chapter 86 Explaining the Comparative Statics in Step-Level Public Good Games, Pages 817-824, Arthur Schram, Theo Offerman, Joep Sonnemans<br/>Chapter 87 Cooperation in VCM Experiments: Results Using the Contribution Function Approach, Pages 825-830, Jordi Brandts, Arthur Schram<br/>Chapter 88 Voluntary Provision of Public Goods, Pages 831-835, Kenneth S. Chan, Stuart Mestelman, R. Andrew Muller<br/>Chapter 89 Intrinsic Motivation in a Public Good Environment, Pages 836-845, Frans van Winden, Frans van Dijk, Joep Sonnemans<br/>Chapter 90 Theoretical Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Experiments, Pages 846-855, Charles A. Holt, Susan K. Laury<br/>Part 6.2: Committees and Voting Groups<br/>Chapter 91 Institutional Modifications of Majority Rule, Pages 857-871, William P. Bottom, Ronald A. King, Larry Handlin, Gary J. Miller<br/>Chapter 92 Endogenous Properties of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium in Spatial Committee Games, Pages 872-879, Rick K. Wilson<br/>Chapter 93 Structure Induced Equilibrium in Spatial Committee Games, Pages 880-888, Rick K. Wilson<br/>Chapter 94 Three-way Experimental Election Results: Strategic Voting, Coordinated Outcomes and Duverger's Law, Pages 889-897, Thomas Rietz<br/>Chapter 95 Participation Game Experiments: Explaining Voter Turnout, Pages 898-901, Joep Sonnemans, Arthur Schram<br/>Part 6.3: Behavior and Organizations<br/>Chapter 96 Growing Organizational Culture in the Laboratory, Pages 903-907, Colin F. Camerer, Roberto Weber<br/><br/>Part 7: Individual Choice, Beliefs and Behavior<br/>7. Individual Choice, Beliefs and Behavior, Pages 911-913<br/>Chapter 97 Motivation Theory and Experimental Behavior under the Decision Cost Hypothesis, Pages 914-922, Vernon L. Smith, James M. Walker<br/>Chapter 98 Intertemporal Choice under Habit Formation, Pages 923-928, Ernst Fehr, Peter K. Zych<br/>Chapter 99 Preference Reversal: Now You See it, Now You Do Not!, Pages 929-938, Peter Bohm<br/>Chapter 100 The Endowment Effect: Evidence of Losses Valued More than Gains, Pages 939-948, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, Richard H. Thaler<br/>Chapter 101 The Endowment Effect, Pages 949-955, Praveen Kujal, Vernon L. Smith<br/>Chapter 102 The Becker–DeGroot–Marschak Mechanism is not Generally Incentive-Compatible in Practice, Pages 956-957, Peter Bohm<br/>Chapter 103 Utility Maximization, Pages 958-966, James C. Cox<br/>Chapter 104 Preference Reversals, Pages 967-975, James C. Cox<br/>Chapter 105 Rationality the Fast and Frugal Way: Introduction, Pages 976-986, Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd<br/>Chapter 106 The Recognition Heuristic and the Less-Is-More Effect, Pages 987-992, Daniel G. Goldstein, Gerd Gigerenzer<br/>Chapter 107 The Recognition Heuristic: A Fast and Frugal Way to Investment Choice?, Pages 993-1003, Andreas Ortmann, Gerd Gigerenzer, Bernhard Borges, Daniel G. Goldstein<br/>Chapter 108 One-Reason Decision Making, Pages 1004-1017, Gerd Gigerenzer, Laura Martignon, Ulrich Hoffrage, J&ouml;rg Rieskamp, Jean Czerlinski, Daniel G. Goldstein<br/>Chapter 109 Cognitive Illusions Reconsidered, Pages 1018-1034, Gerd Gigerenzer, Ralph Hertwig, Ulrich Hoffrage, Peter Sedlmeier<br/>Chapter 110 Social Heuristics, Pages 1035-1046, Peter M. Todd, J&ouml;rg Rieskamp, Gerd Gigerenzer<br/>Chapter 111 Payoff Scale Effects and Risk Preference Under Real and Hypothetical Conditions, Pages 1047-1053, Susan K. Laury, Charles A. Holt<br/>Chapter 112 Rewards and Behavior in First Price Auctions, Pages 1054-1060, Vernon L. Smith, James M. Walker<br/>Chapter 113 Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence, Pages 1061-1073, Catherine C. Eckel, Philip J. Grossman<br/><br/>Part 8: Methods<br/>8. Methods, Page 1077<br/>Chapter 114 Experimetrics: The Use of Market Experiments to Evaluate the Performance of Econometric Estimators, Pages 1078-1086, James C. Cox, Ronald L. Oaxaca<br/>Chapter 115 On the Performance of the Lottery Procedure for Controlling Risk Preferences, Pages 1087-1097, Joyce E. Berg, Thomas A. Rietz, John W. Dickhaut<br/><br/>Author Index of Volume 1, Pages I1-I18<br/>Subject Index of Volume 1, Pages I19-I31</p><br/>

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