<p>1</p><p>文献名： On the theory of infinitely repeated games with discounting</p><p>作者：D. Abreu,</p><p>期刊：, Econometrica 56 (1988) 383–396.</p><p>卷号及页码： </p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/1911077">http://www.jstor.org/pss/1911077</a></p><p></p><p>2</p>文献名： The joint exploitation of a productive asset: a game-theoretic approach <p></p><p>作者：J. Benhabib, R. Radner,</p>期刊：, Econ. Theory 2 (1992) 155–190. <p></p><p>卷号及页码： </p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/j13p344q31x6452k/">http://www.springerlink.com/content/j13p344q31x6452k/</a></p><p></p><p>3</p>文献名： An optimal program for managing common property resources with congestion externalities <p></p><p>作者：G. Brown,</p><p>期刊：, J. Polit. Econ. 82 (1974) 163–173.</p><p>卷号及页码： </p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/1830906">http://www.jstor.org/pss/1830906</a></p><p></p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>4</p><p>文献名：Benefits from Groundwater Management: Magnitude, Sensitivity, and Distribution, by Eli Feinerman and Keith C. Knapp</p><p>作者： </p><p>期刊： </p><p>卷号及页码： </p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/1240458">http://www.jstor.org/pss/1240458</a></p><p></p><p>&nbsp;</p><p>5</p><p>文献名： The tragedy of the commons?</p><p>作者：P.K. Dutta, R.K. Sundaram,</p><p>期刊：, Econ. Theory 3 (1993) 413–426.</p><p>卷号及页码： </p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/n7l4118738xt12n0/">http://www.springerlink.com/content/n7l4118738xt12n0/</a></p><p></p><p>6</p>文献名： Questioning the assumptions of the ‘tragedy of the commons’ model of fisheries <p></p><p>作者：D. Feeny, S. Hanna A. F. McEvoy,</p><p>期刊：, Land Econ. 72(1996) 187–205.</p><p>卷号及页码： </p><p>电子链接：<a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/3146965">http://www.jstor.org/pss/3146965</a></p><p></p>

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