<p><font size="4">1</font></p><p><font size="4">文献名：Rent Under the Assumption of Exhaustibility</font></p><p><font size="4">作者： Lewis Cecil Gray</font></p><p><font size="4">期刊： Quarterly Journal of Economics 28 (1914), pp. 466–489.</font></p><p><font size="4">电子链接：<a href="http://www.jstor.org/pss/1884984">http://www.jstor.org/pss/1884984</a></font></p><p><font size="4"></font></p><p><font size="4">2</font></p><font size="4">文献名： The Common Pool, Bargaining, and the Rule of Capture </font><p></p><p><font size="4">作者： Smith, James L.,</font></p><p><font size="4">期刊： Economic Inquiry; 25(4), October 1987, pages 631-44.</font></p><p><font size="4">电子链接：<a href="http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120020213/abstract">http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/120020213/abstract</a></font></p><p><font size="4"></font></p><p><font size="4">3</font></p><font size="4">文献名： Optimal Pollution Taxes and Endogenous Technological Progress </font><p></p><p><font size="4">作者： Parry, Ian W. H.,</font></p><p><font size="4">期刊： Resource and Energy Economics; 17(1), May 1995, pages 69-85.</font></p><p><font size="4">电子链接：<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VFJ-3Y6PD46-P/2/d56e1e80d502d33c564f0e6c47b68589">http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VFJ-3Y6PD46-P/2/d56e1e80d502d33c564f0e6c47b68589</a></font></p><p><font size="4"></font></p><p><font size="4">4</font></p><p><font size="4">文献名：Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence</font></p><p><font size="4">作者： Walker, James M.; Gardner, Roy; Ostrom, Elinor</font></p><p><font size="4">期刊： Journal of Environmental Economics and Management; 19(3), November 1990, pages 203-11.</font></p><p><font size="4">电子链接：<a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-4CYH2YS-K9/2/35448657a605b1a8ae7594ee8f3e1d4b">http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-4CYH2YS-K9/2/35448657a605b1a8ae7594ee8f3e1d4b</a></font></p><p></p>

[此贴子已经被作者于2008-12-3 10:51:18编辑过]