这是篇在博弈论著名杂志 int j of game theory上发表的论文， 论述在存在外部性条件下婚姻的稳定性......<br/>In many matching problems, it is natural to consider that agents may have<br/>preferences not only over the set of potential partners but also over what other matches<br/>occur. Once such externalities are considered, the set of stable matchings will depend<br/>on what agents believe will happen if they deviate. In this paper, we introduce endogenously<br/>generated beliefs (which depend on the preferences).We introduce a particular<br/>notion of endogenous beliefs, called sophisticated expectations, and show that with<br/>these beliefs, stable matchings always exist.......

[此贴子已经被作者于2009-1-31 17:41:54编辑过]