<p></p><p><br/>Contents:</p><p>Series Foreword ix<br/>Preface xi<br/>Introduction 1<br/>1 “Modeling” and “Bounded Rationality” 1<br/>2 The Aim of This Book 2<br/>3 The State of the Art 3<br/>4 A Personal Note 5<br/>5 Bibliographic Notes 5<br/>1 Bounded Rationality in Choice 7<br/>1.1 The “Rational Man” 7<br/>1.2 The Traditional Economist’s Position 10<br/>1.3 The Attack on the Traditional Approach 13<br/>1.4 Experimental Evidence 16<br/>1.5 Comments 21<br/>1.6 Bibliographic Notes 23<br/>1.7 Projects 24<br/>2 Modeling Procedural Decision Making 25<br/>2.1 Motivation 25<br/>2.2 Preparing the Tools: Similarity Relations 28<br/>2.3 A Procedure of Choice Between Vectors 29<br/>2.4 Analysis 31<br/>2.5 Case-Based Theory 34<br/>2.6 Bibliographic Notes 37<br/>2.7 Projects 37<br/>3M odeling Knowledge 41<br/>3.1 Knowledge and Bounded Rationality 41<br/>3.2 Information Structure 41<br/>3.3 The Set-Theoretical Deªnition of Knowledge 46<br/>3.4 Kripke’s Model 48<br/>3.5 The Impact of the Timing of Decisions and Having<br/>More Information 52<br/>3.6 On the Possibility of Speculative Trade 56<br/>3.7 Bibliographic Notes 60<br/>3.8 Projects 61<br/>4 Modeling Limited Memory 63<br/>4.1 Imperfect Recall 63<br/>4.2 An Extensive Decision Making Model with Imperfect<br/>Information 64<br/>4.3 Perfect and Imperfect Recall 68<br/>4.4 Time Consistency 70<br/>4.5 The Role of Randomization 75<br/>4.6 The Multiselves Approach 78<br/>4.7 On the Problematics of Using the Model 81<br/>4.8 Bibliographic Notes 84<br/>4.9Pr ojects 84<br/>5 Choosing What to Know 87<br/>5.1 Optimal Information Structures 87<br/>5.2 What Is “High” and What Is “Low”? 89<br/>5.3 Manipulating Informational Restrictions 93<br/>5.4 Perceptrons 100<br/>5.5 Bibliographic Notes 104<br/>5.6 Projects 104<br/>6 Modeling Complexity in Group Decisions 107<br/>6.1 Introduction 107<br/>6.2 The Model of a Team 108<br/>6.3 Processing Information 113<br/>6.4 Aggregating Preferences 117<br/>6.5 Bibliographic Notes 119<br/>6.6 Projects 120<br/>vi Contents<br/>7 Modeling Bounded Rationality in Games 121<br/>7.1 Introduction 121<br/>7.2 Interaction Between Luce Players 122<br/>7.3 A Game with Procedural Rational Players 124<br/>7.4 Limited Foresight in Extensive Games 129<br/>7.5 Bibliographic Notes 135<br/>7.6 Projects 135<br/>8 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games 137<br/>8.1 Introduction 137<br/>8.2 The Model of Repeated Games: A Brief Review 138<br/>8.3 Strategies as Machines in Inªnitely Repeated<br/>Games 143<br/>8.4 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games 149<br/>8.5 The Structure of Machine Game Equilibria 152<br/>8.6 Repeated Extensive Games 159<br/>8.7 Concluding Remarks 161<br/>8.8 Bibliographic Notes 163<br/>8.9Pr ojects 163<br/>9 Attempts to Resolve the Finite Horizon Paradoxes 165<br/>9.1 Motivation 165<br/>9.2 Implementation of Strategies by Machines 166<br/>9.3 Counting Is Costly 168<br/>9.4 Bounded Capability to Count 169<br/>9.5 Machines Also Send Messages 170<br/>9.6 The ε-Equilibrium Approach: A Deviation Is Costly 172<br/>9.7 Conclusion 173<br/>9.8 Bibliographic Notes 174<br/>9.9 Projects 174<br/>10 Computability Constraints in Games 175<br/>10.1 Introduction 175<br/>10.2 Informal Results on Computability 178<br/>10.3 Is There a Rational Player? 181<br/>10.4 Turing Machine Game 184<br/>10.5 Bibliographic Notes 185<br/>10.6 Projects 185<br/>Contents vii<br/>11 Final Thoughts 187<br/>11.1 Simon’s Critique 187<br/>11.2 Response 190<br/>References 195<br/>Index 203</p><p><strong>Actually, you can download it from Ariel Rubinstein's website</strong>: <a href="http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/book-br.html">http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/book-br.html</a><br/></p>

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