<p>Microeconomics of Banking (第二版 2008)最新版</p><p>Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet</p><p>The MIT Press<br/>Cambridge, Massachusetts<br/>London, England</p><p>1 Introduction 1<br/>1.1 What Is a Bank, and What Do Banks Do? 1<br/>1.2 Liquidity and Payment Services 2<br/>1.2.1 Money Changing 3<br/>1.2.2 Payment Services 4<br/>1.3 Transforming Assets 4<br/>1.4 Managing Risks 5<br/>1.4.1 Credit Risk 5<br/>1.4.2 Interest Rate and Liquidity Risks 5<br/>1.4.3 O¤-Balance-Sheet Operations 6<br/>1.5 Monitoring and Information Processing 6<br/>1.6 The Role of Banks in the Resource Allocation Process 7<br/>1.7 Banking in the Arrow-Debreu Model 7<br/>1.7.1 The Consumer 8<br/>1.7.2 The Firm 9<br/>1.7.3 The Bank 9<br/>1.7.4 General Equilibrium 9<br/>1.8 Outline of the Book 10<br/>2 The Role of Financial Intermediaries 15<br/>2.1 Transaction Costs 18<br/>2.1.1 Economies of Scope 18<br/>2.1.2 Economies of Scale 19<br/>2.2 Coalitions of Depositors and Liquidity Insurance 20<br/>2.2.1 The Model 20</p><p>2.2.2 Characteristics of the Optimal Allocation 21<br/>2.2.3 Autarky 21<br/>2.2.4 Market Economy 22<br/>2.2.5 Financial Intermediation 23<br/>2.3 Coalitions of Borrowers and the Cost of Capital 24<br/>2.3.1 A Simple Model of Capital Markets with Adverse<br/>Selection 25<br/>2.3.2 Signaling through Self-Financing and the Cost of Capital 26<br/>2.3.3 Coalitions of Borrowers 28<br/>2.3.4 Suggestions for Further Reading 28<br/>2.4 Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring 30<br/>2.5 The Choice between Market Debt and Bank Debt 34<br/>2.5.1 A Simple Model of the Credit Market with Moral<br/>Hazard 34<br/>2.5.2 Monitoring and Reputation 36<br/>2.5.3 Monitoring and Capital 39<br/>2.5.4 Financial Architecture 42<br/>2.5.5 Credit Risk and Dilution Costs 43<br/>2.6 Liquidity Provision to Firms 46<br/>2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 47<br/>2.8 Problems 49<br/>2.8.1 Strategic Entrepreneurs and Market Financing 49<br/>2.8.2 Market versus Bank Finance 50<br/>2.8.3 Economies of Scale in Information Production 50<br/>2.8.4 Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham’s Law 51<br/>2.8.5 Intermediation and Search Costs 52<br/>2.8.6 Intertemporal Insurance 53<br/>2.9 Solutions 54<br/>2.9.1 Strategic Entrepreneurs and Market Financing 54<br/>2.9.2 Market versus Bank Finance 55<br/>2.9.3 Economies of Scale in Information Production 57<br/>2.9.4 Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham’s Law 58<br/>2.9.5 Intermediation and Search Costs 60<br/>2.9.6 Intertemporal Insurance 62<br/>3 The Industrial Organization Approach to Banking 69</p><p></p><p>upload=pdf]viewFile.asp?ID=303362[/upload]</p>[