发展中经济体的汇率制度：道德风险和国际过度借贷，EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES FOR EMERGING MARKETS:MORAL HAZARD AND INTERNATIONAL OVERBORROWING，Ronald I. McKinnon，Huw Pill，发表于Stanford University, Department of Economics inWorking Papers 99018， Jul 1999。

Abstract

July 1999Forthcoming: Oxford Review of Economic Policy
This paper investigates the role of the exchange rate regime in asimple Fisherian model of the overborrowing syndrome. Where domesticbanks are subject to moral hazard, the choice of exchange rate regimemay have important implications for the macroeconomic stability of theeconomy. Banks that enjoy government guarantees have an incentive toincrease foreign borrowing and incur foreign exchange risks that areunderwritten by the deposit insurance system. In the absence of capitalcontrols, this increases the magnitude of overborrowing and leaves theeconomy both more vulnerable to speculative attack and more exposed tothe real economic consequences of such an attack.
While "bad"exchange rate pegs will tend to exacerbate the problem of overborrowingin emerging markets, it is unclear that flexible exchange rate alwaysdominate fixed exchange rates. A "good fix" -- one that is credible andclose to purchasing power parity -- may reduce the "super risk premium"in domestic interest rates and thereby narrow the margin of temptationfor banks to overborrow internationally. Contrary to the currentconsensus regarding the lessons that should be drawn from the Asiancrisis, a good fix may better stabilise the domestic economy whilelimiting moral hazard in the banking system.
JEL Classification: O15, F31, F33.