摘要翻译：
我们研究了与需求敏感性不确定性的相互作用。在我们的解决方案概念中，(1)企业根据其数据分析的复杂程度选择看似最优的策略，(2)复杂程度形成对彼此的最佳反应。在随后的均衡下，企业低估了价格弹性，高估了广告效果，正如经验所观察到的那样。错误的估计导致公司把价格定得太高，并过度宣传。在有策略补充（替代）的博弈中，帕累托利润支配（被支配）纳什均衡的利润。将该模型应用于团队生产游戏，解释了企业家和销售人员过度自信的普遍存在。
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英文标题：
《Naive analytics equilibrium》
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作者：
Ron Berman and Yuval Heller
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最新提交年份：
2021
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly-optimal strategies given the level of sophistication of their data analytics, and (2) the levels of sophistication form best responses to one another. Under the ensuing equilibrium firms underestimate price elasticities and overestimate advertising effectiveness, as observed empirically. The misestimates cause firms to set prices too high and to over-advertise. In games with strategic complements (substitutes), profits Pareto dominate (are dominated by) those of the Nash equilibrium. Applying the model to team production games explains the prevalence of overconfidence among entrepreneurs and salespeople.
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