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摘要翻译:
近年来,在线社交网络在政治竞选中日益突出,与此同时,一些国家经历了令人震惊的选举结果。本文提出了一个将这两种现象联系起来的模型。在我们的研究中,网络中的学习过程受到确认偏差的影响,即忽视相反的证据并将其解释为与自己的信念一致的倾向。当Agent对自身足够重视时,确认偏差会导致任何对称网络中的学习速度变慢,并加剧社会的两极分化。我们确定了一个代理子集,这些代理子集随着确认偏差而变得更/更不具有影响力。社会最优网络结构在很大程度上取决于社会规划者所能获得的信息。当她不能观察到智能体的信念时,最优网络是对称的,顶点传递的,没有自环。我们探讨这些结果对选举结果和媒体市场的影响。确认偏见增加了震惊选举的可能性,并推动边缘媒体采取更极端的意识形态。 --- 英文标题: 《Social networks, confirmation bias and shock elections》 --- 作者: Edoardo Gallo, Alastair Langtry --- 最新提交年份: 2020 --- 分类信息: 一级分类:Economics 经济学 二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学 分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice. 包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。 -- 一级分类:Economics 经济学 二级分类:General Economics 一般经济学 分类描述:General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics. 对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。 -- 一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学 二级分类:Economics 经济学 分类描述:q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学,包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题 -- --- 英文摘要: In recent years online social networks have become increasingly prominent in political campaigns and, concurrently, several countries have experienced shock election outcomes. This paper proposes a model that links these two phenomena. In our set-up, the process of learning from others on a network is influenced by confirmation bias, i.e. the tendency to ignore contrary evidence and interpret it as consistent with one\'s own belief. When agents pay enough attention to themselves, confirmation bias leads to slower learning in any symmetric network, and it increases polarization in society. We identify a subset of agents that become more/less influential with confirmation bias. The socially optimal network structure depends critically on the information available to the social planner. When she cannot observe agents\' beliefs, the optimal network is symmetric, vertex-transitive and has no self-loops. We explore the implications of these results for electoral outcomes and media markets. Confirmation bias increases the likelihood of shock elections, and it pushes fringe media to take a more extreme ideology. --- PDF下载: --> |
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