摘要翻译：
双边平台市场中的跨集团外部性和网络效应决定了市场结构和竞争政策，是广泛研究的主题。较少理解的是当平台设计多对多匹配时出现的组内外部性：与agent$J$匹配的agent$I$的值可能取决于与$J$匹配的agent集。这些影响存在于企业争夺个人习惯或注意力的广泛环境中。在一个具有群内外部性的多对多匹配的一般模型中刻画了平台最优匹配。我证明了一组最优匹配的比较静态结果，并展示了如何利用这些结果来分析各种变化的福利效应，包括平台的纵向整合、市场一侧企业之间的横向合并以及平台信息结构的变化。然后探讨市场结构和监管的两个深入应用。第一种是像亚马逊这样的零售平台上的公司之间的垄断竞争。第二种是多频道视频节目发行商(MVPD)，与电视频道协商转让费，并将这些转让费捆绑销售给个人。
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英文标题：
《Platform-Mediated Competition》
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作者：
Quitz\\\'e Valenzuela-Stookey
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
Cross-group externalities and network effects in two-sided platform markets shape market structure and competition policy, and are the subject of extensive study. Less understood are the within-group externalities that arise when the platform designs many-to-many matchings: the value to agent $i$ of matching with agent $j$ may depend on the set of agents with which $j$ is matched. These effects are present in a wide range of settings in which firms compete for individuals\' custom or attention. I characterize platform-optimal matchings in a general model of many-to-many matching with within-group externalities. I prove a set of comparative statics results for optimal matchings, and show how these can be used to analyze the welfare effects various changes, including vertical integration by the platform, horizontal mergers between firms on one side of the market, and changes in the platform\'s information structure. I then explore market structure and regulation in two in-depth applications. The first is monopolistic competition between firms on a retail platform such as Amazon. The second is a multi-channel video program distributor (MVPD) negotiating transfer fees with television channels and bundling these to sell to individuals.
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