英文标题：
《Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy》
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作者：
Jean-Bernard Chatelain, Kirsten Ralf
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最新提交年份：
2020
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英文摘要：
A minimal central bank credibility, with a non-zero probability of not renegning his commitment (\"quasi-commitment\"), is a necessary condition for anchoring inflation expectations and stabilizing inflation dynamics. By contrast, a complete lack of credibility, with the certainty that the policy maker will renege his commitment (\"optimal discretion\"), leads to the local instability of inflation dynamics. In the textbook example of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, the response of the policy instrument to inflation gaps for optimal policy under quasi-commitment has an opposite sign than in optimal discretion, which explains this bifurcation.
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中文摘要：
最低限度的央行信誉，以及不违背承诺（“准承诺”）的非零概率，是锚定通胀预期和稳定通胀动态的必要条件。相比之下，完全缺乏可信度，再加上政策制定者肯定会背弃承诺（“最佳自由裁量权”），导致通胀动态的局部不稳定。在教科书中的新凯恩斯主义菲利普斯曲线的例子中，政策工具对准承诺下最优政策的通胀缺口的反应与最优自由裁量权的反应具有相反的符号，这解释了这种分歧。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述：General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
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一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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