英文标题：
《Anatomy of a Bail-In》
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作者：
Thomas Conlon, John Cotter
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最新提交年份：
2014
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英文摘要：
To mitigate potential contagion from future banking crises, the European Commission recently proposed a framework which would provide for the $\\textit{bail-in}$ of bank creditors in the event of failure. In this study, we examine this framework retrospectively in the context of failed European banks during the global financial crisis. Empirical findings suggest that equity and subordinated bond holders would have been the main losers from the 535 billion euro impairment losses realized by failed European banks. Losses attributed to senior debt holders would, on aggregate, have been proportionally small, while no losses would have been imposed on depositors. Cross-country analysis, incorporating stress-tests, reveals a divergence of outcomes with subordinated debt holders wiped out in a number of countries, while senior debt holders of Greek, Austrian and Irish banks would have required bail-in.
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中文摘要：
为了缓解未来银行危机的潜在传染，欧盟委员会最近提出了一个框架，该框架将为银行债权人在破产时提供美元的自救金。在本研究中，我们以全球金融危机期间倒闭的欧洲银行为背景，回顾性地研究了这一框架。实证结果表明，股权和次级债券持有人将是失败的欧洲银行实现的5350亿欧元减值损失的主要输家。总的来说，归属于高级债务持有人的损失将按比例较小，而不会对储户造成任何损失。结合压力测试的跨国分析显示，结果存在差异，一些国家的次级债务持有者被消灭，而希腊、奥地利和爱尔兰银行的高级债务持有者则需要自救。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：General Finance 一般财务
分类描述：Development of general quantitative methodologies with applications in finance
通用定量方法的发展及其在金融中的应用
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