英文标题：
《Pareto Efficient Nash Implementation Via Approval Voting》
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作者：
Yakov Babichenko, Leonard J. Schulman
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最新提交年份：
2017
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英文摘要：
We study implementation of a social choice correspondence in the case of two players who have von Neumann - Morgenstern utilities over a finite set of social alternatives, and the mechanism is allowed to output lotteries. Our main positive result shows that a close variant of the popular approval voting mechanism succeeds in selecting only Pareto efficient alternatives as pure Nash equilibria outcomes. Moreover, we provide an exact characterization of pure Nash equilibria profiles and outcomes of the mechanism. The characterization demonstrates a close connection between the approval voting mechanism and the notion of average fixed point, which is a point that is equal to the average of all points that it does not Pareto dominate.
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中文摘要：
我们研究了在有限的社会选择集上具有冯·诺依曼-摩根斯坦效用的两个玩家的社会选择对应的实现，该机制允许输出彩票。我们的主要积极结果表明，一种接近大众认可投票机制的变体成功地仅选择帕累托有效的替代方案作为纯纳什均衡结果。此外，我们还提供了纯纳什均衡曲线和机制结果的精确表征。该特征说明了批准投票机制与平均不动点概念之间的密切联系，平均不动点等于所有不受帕累托支配的点的平均值。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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