英文标题：
《Dynamic Games with Almost Perfect Information》
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作者：
Wei He, Yeneng Sun
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最新提交年份：
2015
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英文摘要：
This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite or infinite horizon dynamic games with perfect or almost perfect information. Under some mild conditions, we prove (1) the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria in general dynamic games with almost perfect information, and (2) the existence of pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria in perfect-information dynamic games with uncertainty. Our results go beyond previous works on continuous dynamic games in the sense that public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. As an illustrative application, a dynamic stochastic oligopoly market with intertemporally dependent payoffs is considered.
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中文摘要：
本文旨在解决具有完全或几乎完全信息的有限或无限视界动态对策的两个基本问题。在一些温和的条件下，我们证明了（1）具有几乎完全信息的一般动态博弈中的子博弈完美均衡的存在性，以及（2）具有不确定性的完全信息动态博弈中纯策略子博弈完美均衡的存在性。我们的结果超越了以往关于连续动态博弈的工作，因为不需要公共随机化和对状态变量的连续性要求。作为一个说明性应用，考虑了一个具有跨期相关收益的动态随机寡头垄断市常
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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