英文标题：
《Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games》
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作者：
Drew Fudenberg, Kevin He
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最新提交年份：
2018
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英文摘要：
Which equilibria will arise in signaling games depends on how the receiver interprets deviations from the path of play. We develop a micro-foundation for these off-path beliefs, and an associated equilibrium refinement, in a model where equilibrium arises through non-equilibrium learning by populations of patient and long-lived senders and receivers. In our model, young senders are uncertain about the prevailing distribution of play, so they rationally send out-of-equilibrium signals as experiments to learn about the behavior of the population of receivers. Differences in the payoff functions of the types of senders generate different incentives for these experiments. Using the Gittins index (Gittins, 1979), we characterize which sender types use each signal more often, leading to a constraint on the receiver\'s off-path beliefs based on \"type compatibility\" and hence a learning-based equilibrium selection.
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中文摘要：
信号博弈中会出现哪些均衡取决于接受者如何解释偏离游戏路径的情况。我们为这些偏离路径的信念建立了微观基础，并在一个模型中进行了相关的均衡优化，在该模型中，均衡是通过患者群体和长寿的发送者和接受者群体的非均衡学习产生的。在我们的模型中，年轻的发送者对游戏的普遍分布是不确定的，因此他们理性地发出不平衡的信号作为实验，以了解接受者群体的行为。不同类型的发送者的支付函数的差异为这些实验产生了不同的激励。使用Gittins指数（Gittins，1979），我们描述了哪些发送方类型更频繁地使用每个信号，从而导致基于“类型兼容性”的接收方偏离路径信念受到约束，从而形成基于学习的均衡选择。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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