英文标题：
《Good signals gone bad: dynamic signalling with switching efforts》
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作者：
Sander Heinsalu
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最新提交年份：
2017
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英文摘要：
This paper examines signalling when the sender exerts effort and receives benefits over time. Receivers only observe a noisy public signal about the effort, which has no intrinsic value. The modelling of signalling in a dynamic context gives rise to novel equilibrium outcomes. In some equilibria, a sender with a higher cost of effort exerts strictly more effort than his low-cost counterpart. The low-cost type can compensate later for initial low effort, but this is not worthwhile for a high-cost type. The interpretation of a given signal switches endogenously over time, depending on which type the receivers expect to send it. JEL classification: D82, D83, C73. Keywords: Dynamic games, signalling , incomplete information
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中文摘要：
本文研究了发送者在一段时间内付出努力并获得利益时的信号传递。接受者只观察到关于努力的嘈杂公共信号，这没有内在价值。动态环境中的信号建模产生了新的平衡结果。在某些均衡中，努力成本较高的发送者比低成本的发送者付出更多的努力。低成本类型可以稍后补偿最初的低工作量，但对于高成本类型来说，这是不值得的。给定信号的解释会随着时间的推移发生内生切换，这取决于接收机预期发送信号的类型。果冻分类：D82、D83、C73。关键词：动态博弈、信号、不完全信息
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Economics 经济学
分类描述：q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学，包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
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一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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