英文标题：
《Optimal contracts under competition when uncertainty from adverse
selection and moral hazard are present》
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作者：
N. Packham
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最新提交年份：
2018
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英文摘要：
In a continuous-time setting where a risk-averse agent controls the drift of an output process driven by a Brownian motion, optimal contracts are linear in the terminal output; this result is well-known in a setting with moral hazard and -under stronger assumptions - adverse selection. We show that this result continues to hold when in addition reservation utilities are type-dependent. This type of problem occurs in the study of optimal compensation problems involving competing principals.
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中文摘要：
在连续时间环境中，风险厌恶主体控制由布朗运动驱动的输出过程的漂移，最优合约在终端输出中是线性的；这一结果在道德风险和逆向选择的环境中是众所周知的。我们表明，当另外的保留实用程序依赖于类型时，这个结果仍然成立。这类问题发生在涉及竞争主体的最优薪酬问题的研究中。
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分类信息：

一级分类：Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类：Portfolio Management 项目组合管理
分类描述：Security selection and optimization, capital allocation, investment strategies and performance measurement
证券选择与优化、资本配置、投资策略与绩效评价
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一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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