Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum
Bargaining and “Weak Link” Coordination Games

Roberto A. Weber
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Abstract

Previous studies have shown that simply knowing one player moves first can affect
behavior in games, even when the first-mover’s moves are known to be unobservable.
This observation violates the game-theoretic principle that timing of unobserved moves is
irrelevant, but is consistent with virtual observability, a theory of how timing can matter
without the ability to observe actions.However, this previous research only shows that
timing matters in games where knowledge that one player moved first can help select that
player’s preferred equilibrium, presenting an alternative explanation to virtual
observability.We extend this work by varying timing of unobservable moves in
ultimatum bargaining games and “weak link” coordination games.In the latter, the
equilibrium selection explanation does not predict any change in behavior due to timing
differences.We find that timing without observability affects behavior in both games,
but not substantially.