Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods

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This paper describes strategic tariff choices within the Ricardian framework of Dornbusch, Fischer, and
Samuelson (1977) using CES preferences. The optimum tariff schedule is uniform across goods and inversely
related to the import demand elasticity of the other country. In the Nash equilibrium of tariffs, larger
economies apply higher tariff rates. Productivity adjusted relative size (≈GDP ratio) is a sufficient statistic
for absolute productivity advantage and the size of the labor force. Both countries apply higher tariff rates if
specialization gains from comparative advantage are high and transportation cost is low. A sufficiently large
economy prefers the inefficient Nash equilibrium in tariffs over free trade due to its quasi-monopolistic
power on world markets. The required threshold size is increasing in comparative advantage and decreasing
in transportation cost. I discuss the implications of the static Nash-equilibrium analysis for the sustainability
and structure of trade agreements.

本文探讨常替代弹性偏好假设下，基于多恩布什、费雪和萨缪尔森合作的一篇描述李嘉图模型论文的基础上的战略关税选择问题。结论是：不同商品的最优关税税则一致并且和别国的进口产品需求弹性成反比。在关税的纳什均衡中，相对规模大的经济体征收更高的关税。要确定绝对生产率优势和劳动力规模，相对生产力调整比率（≈GDP比率）是一个良好替代数据。如果两国利用比较优势进行专业化生产获利很高，同时运输成本很低的话，两国都会采用更高的关税税率。相对于自由贸易而言，一个经济规模足够大的国家更愿意采用低效的纳什均衡下的关税率，因为这个国家对世界市场有近似垄断的影响力。所需要的门槛规模与比较优势呈正相关，与运输成本呈反相关。我讨论了静态纳什均衡中所得税率对贸易协议的存续能力和结构的影响。