送大家三篇免费论文
1、THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN REPEATED GAMES
WITH FREQUENT ACTIONS
BY YULIY SANNIKOV AND ANDRZEJ SKRZYPACZ
We show that in repeated interactions the avenues for effective provision of incen-
tives depend crucially on the type of information players observe. We establish this
conclusion for general repeated two-player games in which information arrives via a
continuous-time stationary process that has a continuous multidimensional Brownian
component and a Poisson component, and in which the players act frequently. The Pois-
son jumps can be used to effectively provide incentives both with transfers and value
burning, while continuous Brownian information can be used to provide incentives only
with transfers.
KEYWORDS: Repeated games, imperfect monitoring, frequent actions, Brownian
motion, Poisson process, Levy decomposition.
2、LEARNING-BY-DOING, ORGANIZATIONAL FORGETTING,
AND INDUSTRY DYNAMICS
BY DAVID BESANKO,ULRICH DORASZELSKI,
YAROSLAV KRYUKOV, AND MARK SATTERTHWAITE1
Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are empirically important in a vari-
ety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition
that accounts for these fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and
dynamics. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, they are
distinct economic forces that interact in subtle ways to produce a great variety of pric-
ing behaviors and industry dynamics. In particular, a model with learning and forget-
ting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, varying degrees of long-run industry
concentration ranging from moderate leadership to absolute dominance, and multiple
equilibria.
3、STATE CAPACITY, CONFLICT, AND DEVELOPMENT
BY TIMOTHY BESLEY AND TORSTEN PERSSON1
The absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key
factor in explaining the persistence of weak states. This paper reports on an ongoing
project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities. The paper sets out a
simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking in-
vestments by government. The approach highlights some determinants of state building
including the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and
dependence on natural resources. Throughout, we link these state capacity investments
to patterns of development and growth.