© Roger A. McCain 2009
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
William Pratt House
9 Dewey Court
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA



PART I HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL SURVEY
1 Objectives and scope of the book 3
2 Representing games 8
3 A brief interpretive history of game theory 27
4 Nash equilibrium and public policy 50
5 Correlated equilibrium 69
6 Non-cooperative sequential games and public policy 85
7 Social mechanism design 109
8 Superadditive games in coalition function form 122
9 Imperfect recall and aggregation of strategies 138
10 Strategy, externality, and rationality 148
PART II ENCAPSULATED COOPERATION
11 Coalition formation and stability 169
12 Bargaining, weak dynamics, and consensus 186
13 Formal aspects of games in partition function form 194
14 Coalitional play 208
15 The government game 227
16 Toward political economy 236
References 245
Index 259