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1、The role of informationand financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting

Author：Anne Beyer , DanielA.Cohen , ThomasZ.Lys , BeverlyR.Walther

Abstract：We review recent literature on the role of financial reportingtransparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers,directors, and shareholders, as well as in reducing agency conflicts betweenshareholders and creditors, and offer researchers some suggested avenues forfuture research. Key themes include the endogenous nature of debt contracts andgovernance mechanisms with respect to information asymmetry between contractingparties, the heterogeneous nature of the informational demands of contractingparties, and the heterogeneous nature of the resulting governance and debtcontracts. We also emphasize the role of a commitment to financial reportingtransparency in facilitating informal multiperiod contracts among managers,directors, shareholders, and creditors.

2、The financial reporting environment:Review of the recent literature

Author：Anne Beyer , DanielA.Cohen, ThomasZ.Lys ,Beverly R.Walther

Abstract：The corporate information environment develops endogenouslyas a consequence of information asymmetries and agency problems between investors,entrepreneurs, and managers. We review current research on the three maindecisions that shape the corporate information environment in capital marketsettings: (1) managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions, (2) disclosuresmandated by regulators, and (3) reporting decisions by analysts. We concludethat, in the last ten years, research has generated several useful insights.Despite this progress, we call for researchers to consider interdependenciesbetween the various decisions that shape the corporate information environmentand suggest new and interesting issues for researchers to address.

3、Corporate governancemyths: Comments on Armstrong, Guay, and Weber

Author：James A. Brickley, Jerold L. Zimmerman

Abstract：This paper argues that academics, politicians, and the mediahave six commonly held but misguided beliefs about corporate governance. WhileArmstrong et al. (2010) discuss some of thesemisconceptions, a widerrecognition that these beliefs are actually ‘‘myths’’ is important. Theyinclude: (1) a common definition of ‘‘corporate governance’’ exists; (2) auseful distinction is ‘‘internal’’ versus ‘‘external’’ governance mechanisms;(3) outside directors perform two separable roles: to advise andmonitormanagers; (4) research has identified ‘‘good’’ and ‘‘bad’’ governancepractices; (5) a ‘‘good’’ governance index can be constructed; and (6)corporate governance ‘‘best practices’’ can be deduced from peer data.

4、Understanding earningsquality: A review of the proxies, their determinants and their consequences

Author：Patricia Dechow, WeiliGe , CatherineSchrand

Abstract：Researchers have used various measures as indications of‘‘earnings quality’’ including persistence, accruals, smoothness, timeliness,loss avoidance, investor responsiveness, and external indicators such asrestatements and SEC enforcement releases. For each measure, we discuss causesof variation in the measure as well as consequences. We reach no singleconclusion on what earnings quality is because ‘‘quality’’ is contingent on thedecision context. We also point out that the ‘‘quality’’ of earnings is afunction of the firm’s fundamental performance. The contribution of a firm’sfundamental performance to its earnings quality is suggested as one area forfuture work.

5、Earnings quality research:Advances, challenges and future research

Author：Mark L. DeFond

Abstract：This discussion makes several observations regarding theearnings quality research reviewed in Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) (DGS). Idiscuss someof the factors that led to the large growth in the earnings qualityliterature over the past two decades, and note a few of the importantcontributions from this literature. I also present what I view as several majorchallenges the literature faces as well as some avenues for future research. Inaddition, I discuss the difficulties in evaluating such a diverse body ofliterature, and comment on DGS’s major conclusions.

6、A review of tax research

Author：Michelle Hanlon, ShaneHeitzman

Abstract：In this paper, we present a review of tax research. We surveyfour main areas of the literature: (1) the informational role of income taxexpense reported for financial accounting, (2) corporate tax avoidance, (3)corporate decision-making including investment, capital structure, andorganizational form, and (4) taxes and asset pricing. We summarize the researchareas and questions examined to date and what we have learned or not learnedfrom the work completed thus far. In addition, we provide our opinion as to theinteresting and important issues for future research.

7、Implications for GAAP froman analysis of positive research in accounting

Author：S.P. Kothari , KarthikRamanna , DouglasJ.Skinner

Abstract：Based on extant literature, we review the positive theory ofGAAP. The theory predicts that GAAP’s principal focus is on control(performance measurement and stewardship) and that verifiability andconservatism are critical features of a GAAP shaped by market forces. Werecognize the advantage of using fair values in circumstances where these arebased on observable prices in liquid secondary markets, but caution againstexpanding fair values to financial reporting more generally. We conclude thatrather than converging U.S. GAAP with IFRS, competition between the FASB andthe IASB would allow GAAP to better respond to market forces.

8 Discussion of ‘‘ Implications for GAAPfrom an analysis of positive research inaccounting’’

Author：Richard Lambert

Abstract：This paper discusses the paper ‘‘Implications for GAAP froman Analysis of Positive Research in Accounting,’’ by Kothari, Ramanna, andSkinner (in press). I discuss the role that information can play in efficientlyallocating capital in the economy, and I argue that the GAAP is not primarilydesigned with the objective of addressing ‘‘control’’ issues, i.e., resolvingcontracting problems between shareholders and managers or between shareholdersand bondholders. I also discuss the impact that conservatism has on theproperties of accounting numbers, and on how it affects the usefulness of thesenumbers in managerial incentive contracts and in contracts with bondholders.

9、Accounting anomalies and fundamentalanalysis: An alternative view

Author：Jonathan Lewellen

Abstract：The literature on accounting anomalies and fundamentalanalysis provides important insights into the behavior of stock prices and therelation between accounting numbers and firm value. My review discusses fivekey topics from this literature: (1) discriminating between risk and mispricingexplanations for return anomalies; (2) estimating the implied cost of capital;(3) inferring investors’ perceptions of the earnings process; (4) under-standing the importance of trading costs and firm size; and (5) improving theconstruction of characteristic-based trading strategies. My discussionhighlights important challenges facing the literature and offers suggestionsfor improving empirical tests.

10、Accounting anomalies andfundamental analysis: A review of recent research advances

Author：Scott Richardson, Irem Tuna , PeterWysocki

Abstract：We survey recent research in accounting anomalies andfundamental analysis. We use forecasting of future earnings and returns as ourorganizing framework and suggest a roadmap for research aiming to document theforecasting benefits of accounting information. We combine this with opinionsfrom the academic and practitioner communities to critically evaluate keyclusters of papers about accounting anomalies and fundamental analysisdisseminated over the last decade. Finally, we provide a new analysis on how anex ante and ex post treatment of risk and transaction costs affects the accrualand PEAD anomalies, and offer suggestions for future research.