如题，本文是一篇脑神经经济学结合博弈论所写的一篇论文，里面提出了一个新的理论模型： game theory of mind， 就是说我考虑我的策略，我考虑你的策略，你考虑到我考虑到你的策略，我考虑到你考虑到我考虑到你的策略。。。。。。。。。等，同时给出了实验验证，是一篇不错的论文。

This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise
our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’.
First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically,
the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value
function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However,
if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent’s degree of recursion
(i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent’s sophistication, given
behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify
their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with,
and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we
note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through
prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal
game theory and coevolution.