摘要翻译:
如果一个平衡不受新的交流机会和重新谈判的影响,那么它就是可以沟通的。我们刻画了具有博弈前沟通的协调博弈均衡集,其中参与者对可行的协调结果具有私人偏好。在这样的博弈中,通信证明均衡提供了从大量定性不同的贝叶斯纳什均衡中的狭窄选择。在一个避免沟通的均衡条件下,玩家永远不会错配,只要有他们共同喜欢的结果,就玩他们共同喜欢的结果,并且只交流他们偏好的序数部分。此外,这种均衡对参与者信念的变化是稳健的,是临时帕累托有效的,并且是进化稳定的。
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英文标题:
《Communication, Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values
(Extended Version)》
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作者:
Yuval Heller and Christoph Kuzmics
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最新提交年份:
2021
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. Communication-proof equilibria provide a narrow selection from the large set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria in such games. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play their jointly preferred outcome whenever there is one, and communicate only the ordinal part of their preferences. Moreover, such equilibria are robust to changes in players' beliefs, interim Pareto efficient, and evolutionarily stable.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2005.05713