Andrew Schotter The Economic Theory of Social Institutions《社会制度的经济理论》-经管之家官网！

Andrew Schotter The Economic Theory of Social Institutions经济学家安德鲁.肖特的《社会制度的经济理论》英文原版
“最早从博弈论的研究视角探讨人类社会制度现象的一部著作”——详见中文版韦森教授写的中译本序
Preface
1 The nature and function of social institutions
1.1 Toward a new view of economics
1.2 Welfare economics and comparative social institutions: the optimal rules of the game
1.3 Who should study social institutions?
Game 1.1 : The traffic game
1.4 Institutions defined
Game 1.2 : The telephone game
1.5 Methodology
1.6 Institutions and indeterminacy
Game 1.3: Buddies
1.7 Some game-theoretical terminology
1.8 A preview of things to come
2 State-of-nature theory and the rise of social institutions
2.1 Situations likely to lead to the creation of social institutions
Problems of coordination
Prisoners' dilemma games
Inequality-preserving social institutions
Explicitly and organically determined social institutions in
cooperative game contexts
2.2 Some examples
Coordination problems and coordination institutions
The evolution of the week
The evolution of money
Prisoners' dilemma problems and social institutions
The rules of war and rule utilitarianism
Oligopolistic markets
Inequality-preserving institutions: property rights and the status quo
Cooperative institutions: the emergence of the state
2.3 Summary
3 A mathematical theory of institution creation
Institution creation in a two-person world
3.1 Institution creation i n a prisoners' dilemma world
3.2 Supergames
3.3 Equilibria in supergames: equilibrium conventions and institutions
3.4 Static Bayesian solution procedures
3.5 The analysis
3.6 Equilibria
3.7 Summary
The general case
3.8 Background preliminaries
3.9 The random walk model for our analysis
3.10 Absorption and first passage times: assumptions for our model
3.11 Absorption and first passage times: general results
3.12 The limiting diffusion process
3.13 Transformation of the coordinate system
3.14 Application of the theory of diffusion processes to the solution of supergame problems
3.15 An example
Appendix: Details of the proof of Lemma 3.1 and associated results
4 Information and social institutions
4. 1 Games in extensive form
4.2 Institutions and information
Game 4. 1 : The strictly convex barter game
Game 4.2: The not-strictly-convex barter game
4.3 The extensive form representation: a game in agent normal form with imperfect recall
4.4 Institution-assisted games
4.5 Entropy and the information content of norms and institutions
Information theory
Institutions and chaos
4.6 Conclusions
5 Toward a neo-institutional approach to economics
5.1 Institutions, teams, hierarchies, satisficing, and bounded rationality
Teams
Hierarchies
Satisficing and bounded rationality
5.2 The neo-institutional approach to economics and social phenomena
Institutions and neoclassical theory
The game-theoretical revolution
The core and cooperative games: some disappointing results
Noncooperative games
The design of optimal institutions
Market structure and the theory of industrial organization
International relations, conventions of war, and institutions
5.3 Sociobiology, behavior, and social institutions
5.4 Summary and conclusions
Notes
Bibliography
Index