创业投资文献
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Abstract
Why don't successful venture capitalists eliminate excess demand for their follow-on funds by
aggressively raising their fees? We propose and test a theory of learning that leads to informational
hold-up in the VC market. Investors in a fund learn whether the VC has skill or was lucky, whereas
potential outside investors only observe returns. This gives the VC's current investors hold-up
power when the VC raises his next fund: Without their backing, he cannot persuade anyone else
to fund him, since outside investors would interpret the lack of backing as a sign that his skill
is low. This hold-up power diminishes the VC's ability to increase fees in line with performance.
The model provides a rationale for the persistence in after-fee returns documented by Kaplan and
Schoar (2005) and predicts low expected returns among rst-time funds, persistence in investors
from fund to fund, and over-subscription in follow-on funds raised by successful VCs. Our empirical
evidence from a large sample of U.S. VC funds raised between 1980 and 2006 is consistent with
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