There is an assumption, at least implicitly that when local governments are more decentralized, they are more likely to be entrepreneurial. This assumption is rooted in several premises. First, Chinese local governments serve two roles simultaneously: service providers and economic developers. There is little doubt that Chinese economic development has been largely driven by state interventions and that investing in public infrastructure and waves of fiscal stimulus are necessary to keep the momentum. It does not come as a surprise that local governments all resources at their disposal to develop economy. Second, local governments have motivation to be entrepreneurial as local officials are engaged in arm races for promotion. The centralized political and personnel control provides a great motivation for them to be actively engaged in economic intervention. However, it is an empirical question whether local officials are entrepreneurial or not and if so, in what ways. I will address this issue by focusing on the fiscal materials from county levels as information on county levels vary substantially and presents a great laboratory for others. The focus is to see how much spending are divided between administrative fees and social service provision. After all, the former is mot self-sustaining and interest-oriented, whereas the latter being more on economic development. Further diving social service provision into different categories may help to tell a better story regarding whether their motivation is truly on the right track. The paper will be available upon request.