山大行为实验经济学公开分享荟2021年第16期预告

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廿五经研”建院25周年25场学术系列报告之二十五暨山大行为实验经济学公开分享荟2021年第16期预告：<br>
主讲人：张琨<br>
时间：2021年12月24日（周五）上午10：00<br>
地点：邵逸夫科学馆第五会议室&腾讯会议ID：348559263<br>
题目：CEO Incentives, Investment Decisions and Firm Value: Theory and Experimental Evidence<br>
主讲人简介：<br>
张琨，河北经贸大学商学院副教授，硕士生导师。2016年获得阿伯丁大学经济学博士学位（国家公派），主要从事行为金融、公司金融、实验经济等方向研究。2019年在澳大利亚莫纳什大学做访问学者、2018年在新西兰怀卡托大学做访问学者。其文发表于《Asian Business & Management》、《会计研究》、《教育发展研究》、《南京大学学报》等SSCI和CSSCI期刊。目前主持国家自然科学基金1项，省部级课题3项。<br>
摘要: This paper theoretically and experimentally investigates how different tournament incentives affect managerial decision-making and firm value. Our theoretical model shows that when the economy is in a downturn, a linear incentive and elimination contests (ECs) can ensure that CEO-optimal investment (maximize personal income) is consistent with firm-optimal investment (maximize firm value), while a winner-takes-all (WTA) tournament makes CEO-optimal investment deviate from firm-optimal investment. When the economy is prosperous, a linear incentive and WTA can ensure that CEO-optimal investment is consistent with firm-optimal investment, while ECs make CEO-optimal investment deviate from firm-optimal investment. Experimental results broadly support above predictions. However, ECs (WTA) are more efficient than the linear incentive when the economy is in a downturn (is prosperous). We conjecture that this is because ECs and WTA involving interactions between subjects induce learning effects. In addition, WTA and ECs lead to more rational behavior than the linear incentive.

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关键词：实验经济学 经济学 Experimental interactions Theoretical