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这20多篇papers都是我照着下面的readinglist的第一部分挨篇下载的，大家应该充分相信这里每一篇都是Game theory的经典，有一定基础又真打算在这个方向发展下去的同学这些论文都是必读的。现在发上来希望对大家能有帮助。
考虑到我下载这些拉论文也不容易，大家如果真觉得喜欢就顶一下帖子，那样才能有更多的人看到。这个list后面几部分列出的论文我过些时候也会都下载下来，到时候再传给大家。另外，如果可能，希望版主能奖励一些现金。
补：part1的论文还是有两三篇没下载到，我自己则另外添了几篇进去。总共是24篇
Economics 2053: Topics in Game Theory
The class website is http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~econ2053/
OH: Fudenberg Wed 2-4
Ambrus Wed 2-4
To get credit for the class, write a paper and/or give a presentation.
Part II: Selected Topics In Game Theory
Suggested Textbooks:
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole [1991] Game Theory,
Myerson, R. B. [1991] Game theory: analysis of conflict,
Fagin, R., J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses and M. Y. Vardi [1995] Reasoning about knowledge,
1. Modeling knowledge and beliefs in interactive environments
Harsanyi, J. [1967-68]: “Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players, I, II, III,” Management Science 14 (3) 159-182, 14 (5) 320-334, 14 (7) 486-502.
Aumann, R. [1976] “Agreeing to Disagree,” The Annals of Statistics 4 (6), 1236-1239
Pearce, D. [1984] “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,” Econometrica 52 (5), 1029-1050
Bernheim, D. [1984] “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,” Econometrica 52 (4), 1007-1028
Aumann, R. [1987] “Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian -Rationality,” Econometrica 55 (1), 1-18
Brandenburger, A. and
Tan, T.C.C. and S.R.C. Werlang[1988] “The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games,” Journal of Economic Theory 45 (2), 370-391
Fudenberg, D., D. M Kreps. and D. K. Levine [1988] “On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements..,” Journal of Economic Theory 44 (2), 354-80
Rubinstein, A. [1989] “The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under ‘Almost Common Knowledge,’” American Economic Review 79 (3), 385-391
Dekel, E. and D. Fudenberg[1990] “Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty,” Journal of Economic Theory 52 (2), 243-67
Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel [1993] “Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge,” Journal of Economic Theory 59 (1), 189-198
Carlsson, H. And E. Van Damme [1993] “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,” Econometrica 61 (5), 989-1018
Aumann, R. and A. Brandenburger [1995] “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium,” Econometrica 63 (5), 1161-1180
Dekel, E. and F. Gul [1997] “Rationality and Knowledge in Game Theory” in Advances in Economics and Econometrics, D. Kreps and K. Wallis, eds. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK
Gul, F. [1998] "A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View," Econometrica 66 (4), 923-928
Battigalli, P [1997] “On rationalizability in extensive games,” Journal of Economic Theory 74 (1), 40-61
Dekel, E., B. Lipman and A. Rustichini [1998] “Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness,” Econometrica 66 (1), 159-174
Battigalli, P. and G. Bonanno [1999] “Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory,” Research In Economics 53 (2), 149-225
Morris, S. and H. Shin [2001] “Global Games: Theory and Applications..,” Yale Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~sm326/seattle.pdf
Feinberg,Y [2002] “Subjective reasoning in dynamic games,” mimeo
http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/feinberg/Pdf/subepi1.PDF
Morris, S. [2002] “Typical Types,” mimeo Yale
http://www.courses.fas.harvard.edu/~ec2052/Papers_Not_Available_Elsewhere/
Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi [2003] “Rationalization and incomplete information,” mimeo Bocconi and Northwestern
http://faculty.econ.northwestern.edu/faculty/siniscalchi/bs03iig.pdf
Yildiz,M. and J. Weinstein [2003] “Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty,” mimeo MIT
http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/download_pdf.php?id=588
Ely, J. and M. Peski [2004] “Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability,” mimeo Northwestern
2. Cheap talk
Crawford, V. and J. Sobel [1982] “Strategic information transmission,” Econometrica 50 (6), 1431-51
Rabin, M. [1990] “Communication between Rational Agents,” JET 51, 144-70
Farrell, J. [1993] “Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games,” Games and Economic Behavior 5 (4), 514-31
Farrell, J. and M. Rabin [1996] “Cheap talk,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (3), 103-18
Zapater,
Glazer, J. and A. Rubinstein [2001] “Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules,” Games and Economic Behavior 36 (2), 158-73
Battaglini, M. [2002] “Multiple referrals and multidimensional cheap talk,” Econometrica 70 (4), 1379-140
Aumann, R. and S. Hart [2003] “Long cheap talk”; Econometrica 71 (6), 1619-1660
http://www.ma.huji.ac.il/~hart/papers/long.pdf
Olszewski, W. [2002] “Informal communication,” JET forthcoming
http://www.nyu.edu/sed2002/pdfs/gt1-2-txt.pdf
Austen-Smith, D. and T. Feddersen [2002] “Deliberation and voting rules,” mimeo
Gerardi, D. and L. Yariv [2003] “Putting your ballot where your mouth is,” mimeo
Gerardi, D. and L. Yariv [2003] “Committee design in the presence of communication,” mimeo
Levy, G. and R. Razin [2003] “Multidimensional cheap talk,” mimeo LSE and NYU
http://homepages.nyu.edu/~rr71/CT.pdf
3. Coalitional bargaining
Bloch, F. [1996] “Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division,” GAEB 14 (1), 90-123
Chatterjee, K., B. Dutta, D. Ray and K. Sengupta [1993] “A noncooperative theory of coalitional bargaining,” ReStud 60 (2), 463-477
Ray, D. and R. Vohra [1997] “Equilibrium binding agreements,” JET 73 (1), 30-78
Ray, D. and R. Vohra [1999] “A theory of endogeneous coalition structures,” GAEB 26 (2), 286-336
Ray, D. and R. Vohra [2001] “Coalitional power and public goods,” JPE 109, 1355-1383
Konishi, H. and D. Ray [2003] “Coalition formation as a dynamic process,” JET 110 (1), 1-41
Gomes, A. [2004] “Multilateral contracting with externalities,” mimeo UPenn
http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~gomes/mcever4.pdf
5. Interactive preferences, Psychology and games
Schall, L. D. [1972] “Interdependent utilities and Pareto optimality,” QJE 86 (1), 19-24
Pearce, D. [1983] “Nonpaternalistic sympathy and the inefficiency of consistent intertemporal plans,” mimeo Yale
not on the web, will be distributed at the course
Ray, D. [1987] “Intergenerational altruism,” JET 41 (4), 112-32
Hori, H. and S. Kanaya [1989] “Utility Functionals with Nonpaternalistic Intergenerational Altruism,” JET 49 (2), 241-65
Bruce, N. and M. Waldman [1991] “Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic,” AER 81 (5), 1345-51
Geanakoplos J., D. Pearce and E. Stachetti [1989] “Psychological games and sequential rationality,” GAEB 1 (1), 60-79
Rabin, M. [1993] “Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics,” AER 83 (5), 1281-1302
Rabin M. [1998] “Psychology and economics,” Journal of Economic Literature 36 (1), 11-46
Fehr, E. and S. Gachter [1998] “Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans,” European Economic Review 42, 845-59
Fehr, E. and K. Scmidt [1999] “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation,” QJE 114 (3), 817-68
Fehr, E. and S. Gachter [2000] “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14 (3), 159-81
Kockesen, L., E. Ok and R. Sethi [2000] “The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences,” JET 92 (2), 274-99
Lopomo, G. and E. Ok [2001] “Bargaining, Interdependence, and the Rationality of Fair Division,” RAND Journal of Economics 32, 263-83
Camerer, C. [2001] “Behavioral Game Theory: The Psychology of Strategic Thinking,” mimeo California Institute of Technology
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/Camerer.pdf
64194.rar
(36.03 MB)
本附件包括：- Aumann Agreeing to Disagree.pdf
- Aumann Common Priors A Reply to Gul.pdf
- Aumann Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian -Rationality.pdf
- Aumann&BrandenburgEpistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium.pdf
- Battigali On rationalizability in extensive games.pdf
- Battigali Rationalization and incomplete information.pdf
- Battigali@Bonnano Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory.pdf
- Bernheim Rationalizable Strategic Behavior.pdf
- Brandenburg&Dekel Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge.pdf
- Brandenburg&Dekel Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria.pdf
- Carlsson&Van Damme Global Games and Equilibrium Selection.pdf
- Dekel&Lipman&Rosthini Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness.pdf
- Ely&Peski Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability.pdf
- Feinberg Subjective reasoning in dynamic games.pdf
- Frank Gul A Comment on Aumann's Bayesian View.pdf
- Harsarnyi Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players I.pdf
- Harsarnyi Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players II.pdf
- Harsarnyi Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players III.pdf
- Harsarnyi Selton A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information.pdf
- Kahneman Evaluation by moments.pdf
- Milgrom&Roberts Predation reputation and entry detterence.pdf
- Pearce Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection.pdf
- Rubinstein The Electronic Mail Game Strategic Behavior Under Almost Common Knowledge.pdf
- Weinstein&Yildiz Impact of Higher-Order Uncertainty.pdf
[此贴子已经被作者于2006-9-18 3:23:05编辑过]
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