摘要翻译:
效率与公平是否一致?我们解决这个问题的方法涉及具有不同偏好的多个个体必然会消费同一包的情况。家庭是我们的榜样:父亲、母亲和孩子可以在同一个花园、厨房和假期里消费。我们以三种不同的方式将三个最流行的公平原则:无嫉妒、平等主义对等和公平分享保证中的每一个适用于家庭世界。对于任何给定的公平标准,如果一个分配根据每个家庭的每个成员都是公平的,那么它就是一致公平的;如果它根据所有家庭成员偏好的一个特定集合是公平的,那么它就是总体公平的;如果它根据家庭的--通常是不完全的--偏好是公平的,那么它就是集体公平的,当且仅当家庭的每个成员把第一个集合排列在第二个集合之上时,当且仅当家庭的每个成员把第一个集合排列在第二个集合之上。虽然效率通常与一致的平等主义等值不相容,在三个或三个以上家庭的经济中也与一致的无嫉妒不相容,但在只有两个家庭的经济中,一致的无嫉妒的效率分配总是存在的。一致公平份额保证是容易实现的:在一般条件下,具有公平份额保证的有效分配集合包含一些集体无嫉妒和一些集体平等的等价分配。我们使用传统市场均衡方法的修正版本和词典优化来建立我们的结果。
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英文标题:
《Fair and Efficient Division among Families》
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作者:
Sophie Bade and Erel Segal-Halevi
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最新提交年份:
2020
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
Is efficiency consistent with fairness? Our approach to this question concerns the case where multiple individuals with diverse preferences are bound to consume the same bundle. Families are our lead example: the father, mother and children get to consume the same garden, kitchen, and vacations. We adapt each of the three most popular principles of fairness: envy-freeness, egalitarian-equivalence and the fair-share guarantee, in three different ways to the world of families. For any given criterion of fairness, an allocation is *unanimous-fair* if it is fair according to every individual member of each family, it is *aggregate-fair* if it is fair according to a particular aggregation of all family members' preferences, and it is *collective-fair* if it is fair according to the family's -- typically incomplete -- preferences, that rank a bundle above another bundle if and only if each member of the family ranks the first bundle above the second. While efficiency is generally incompatible with unanimous egalitarian equivalence, and incompatible with unanimous envy-freeness in economies with three or more families, unanimously envy-free efficient allocations always exist in economies with just two families. The unanimous fair share guarantee is easy to achieve: Under generic conditions the set of efficient allocations with the fair share guarantee contains some collectively envy-free and some collectively egalitarian equivalent allocations. We use modified versions of the traditional market equilibrium approach and lexicographic optimization to establish our results.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1811.06684