摘要翻译:
我们提出了一个受约束的资源配置问题的伪市场解。我们对约束的处理是一般性的:包括由于考虑学校选择的多样性或课程分配的时间表而产生的双层次约束;以及建模所需的其他形式的约束,例如,室友市场和组合分配问题。约束会产生金钱外部性,并通过价格内部化。代理人在其购买影响均衡价格下相关约束的价值的范围内支付。其结果是一个有约束的有效市场均衡结果。只要约束条件不挑出单个代理,结果是公平的。我们的结果可以推广到有捐赠的经济体,并解决参与限制。
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英文标题:
《Constrained Pseudo-market Equilibrium》
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作者:
Federico Echenique and Antonio Miralles and Jun Zhang
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最新提交年份:
2020
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分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in course allocation; and other forms of constraints needed to model, for example, the market for roommates, and combinatorial assignment problems. Constraints give rise to pecuniary externalities, which are internalized via prices. Agents pay to the extent that their purchases affect the value of relevant constraints at equilibrium prices. The result is a constrained efficient market equilibrium outcome. The outcome is fair whenever the constraints do not single out individual agents. Our result can be extended to economies with endowments, and address participation constraints.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1909.05986