摘要翻译:
我们研究了生产市场中的针锋相对动态,其中每个参与者都可以在系统中输入不同数量的商品,从而获得一个良好的给定。在针锋相对的动态中,每一个玩家将自己的商品分配给邻国,比例与他们在上一轮生产中的贡献成正比。针锋相对不使用金钱,以前在纯交换环境中研究过。我们研究了当估值对称(即每件商品对每个人都有相同的价值)时,这个动态的相变,通过刻画哪些参与者随着时间的推移而增长或消失。我们还研究了它们的投资份额在长期内是如何演变的,表明在极限条件下,参与者只对具有最优生产能力的参与者进行投资。
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英文标题:
《Tit-for-Tat Dynamics and Market Volatility》
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作者:
Simina Br\^anzei
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最新提交年份:
2019
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分类信息:
一级分类:Computer Science 计算机科学
二级分类:Computer Science and Game Theory 计算机科学与博弈论
分类描述:Covers all theoretical and applied aspects at the intersection of computer science and game theory, including work in mechanism design, learning in games (which may overlap with Learning), foundations of agent modeling in games (which may overlap with Multiagent systems), coordination, specification and formal methods for non-cooperative computational environments. The area also deals with applications of game theory to areas such as electronic commerce.
涵盖计算机科学和博弈论交叉的所有理论和应用方面,包括机制设计的工作,游戏中的学习(可能与学习重叠),游戏中的agent建模的基础(可能与多agent系统重叠),非合作计算环境的协调、规范和形式化方法。该领域还涉及博弈论在电子商务等领域的应用。
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一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要:
We study the tit-for-tat dynamic in production markets, where each player can make a good given as input various amounts of goods in the system. In the tit-for-tat dynamic, each player allocates its good to its neighbors in fractions proportional to how much they contributed in its production in the last round. Tit-for-tat does not use money and was studied before in pure exchange settings. We study the phase transitions of this dynamic when the valuations are symmetric (i.e. each good has the same worth to everyone) by characterizing which players grow or vanish over time. We also study how the fractions of their investments evolve in the long term, showing that in the limit the players invest only on players with optimal production capacity.
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PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1911.03629