发帖
雷达卡
摘要翻译：
我研究了一个社会学习模型，在这个模型中，学习的对象是战略参与者的内生行为，而不是外生状态。一个有耐心的卖家面对一系列的买家，并决定是否建立一个提供高质量产品的声誉。每个买家都不能获得卖家的完整记录，但可以观察所有之前买家的行为，以及一些关于卖家行为的信息性私人信号。我研究了买家的私人信号如何影响社会学习的速度和卖家建立声誉的动机。当每个买方私下观察卖方过去行为的一个有界子集时，学习速度严格来说是正的，但随着卖方变得耐心，学习速度可能消失为零。因此，声誉建设会导致病人卖家的低回报和低社会福利。当每个买方观察到关于卖方当前时期行动的无限信息的私人信号时，学习的速度从下到下是一致有界的，耐心的卖方可以从建立声誉中获得高回报。我的结果揭示了各种政策在加速社会学习和鼓励卖家建立良好声誉方面的有效性。
---
英文标题：
《Reputation Building under Observational Learning》
---
作者：
Harry Pei
---
最新提交年份：
2020
---
分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--
---
英文摘要：
I study a social learning model in which the object to learn is a strategic player's endogenous actions rather than an exogenous state. A patient seller faces a sequence of buyers and decides whether to build a reputation for supplying high quality products. Each buyer does not have access to the seller's complete records, but can observe all previous buyers' actions, and some informative private signal about the seller's actions. I examine how the buyers' private signals affect the speed of social learning and the seller's incentives to establish reputations. When each buyer privately observes a bounded subset of the seller's past actions, the speed of learning is strictly positive but can vanish to zero as the seller becomes patient. As a result, reputation building can lead to low payoff for the patient seller and low social welfare. When each buyer observes an unboundedly informative private signal about the seller's current-period action, the speed of learning is uniformly bounded from below and a patient seller can secure high returns from building reputations. My results shed light on the effectiveness of various policies in accelerating social learning and encouraging sellers to establish good reputations.
---
PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2006.08068
京公网安备 11010802022788号
