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摘要翻译：
基于现实匹配问题的需要，本文针对由多个部门组成的机构，提出了一大类实用的选择规则--广义词典选择规则（General Lexicographic choice Rule，GLCR)。制度按顺序填充它们的分区，每个分区都被赋予一个子选择规则，该规则满足经典的替代性和规模单调性，以及我们引入的一个新性质--配额单调性。我们允许部门之间以能力转移的形式进行丰富的互动。一个机构的总体选择规则被定义为其部门的子选择的联合。关于GLCR的累积报价机制(COM)是唯一稳定且具有策略验证性的机制。我们定义了一个基于选择的改进概念，并表明COM尊重改进。我们利用本文在我们的同伴论文AYG\“Un and Turhan(2020)中发展的理论，为印度设计了具有全面平权行动约束的令人满意的匹配机制。
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英文标题：
《Matching with Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules》
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作者：
Orhan Ayg\"un and Bertan Turhan
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最新提交年份：
2020
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分类信息：
一级分类：Economics 经济学
二级分类：Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述：Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
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英文摘要：
Motivated by the need for real-world matching problems, this paper formulates a large class of practical choice rules, Generalized Lexicographic Choice Rules (GLCR), for institutions that consist of multiple divisions. Institutions fill their divisions sequentially, and each division is endowed with a sub-choice rule that satisfies classical substitutability and size monotonicity in conjunction with a new property that we introduce, quota monotonicity. We allow rich interactions between divisions in the form of capacity transfers. The overall choice rule of an institution is defined as the union of the sub-choices of its divisions. The cumulative offer mechanism (COM) with respect to GLCR is the unique stable and strategy-proof mechanism. We define a choice-based improvement notion and show that the COM respects improvements. We employ the theory developed in this paper in our companion paper, Ayg\"un and Turhan (2020), to design satisfactory matching mechanisms for India with comprehensive affirmative action constraints.
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PDF链接：
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2004.13261
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