摘要翻译:
最近的技术进步使公司能够以较低的成本灵活地处理和分析复杂的员工绩效数据。我们发展了一个最优激励合同理论,其中管理上述程序的监控技术是设计者战略规划的一部分。在另一个带有道德风险的标准委托代理模型中,我们允许委托人将代理人的绩效数据划分为任何有限的类别,并为输出信号携带的信息量付费。通过对激励Agent和节约监控成本之间的权衡分析,我们得到了最优监控技术的特征,如信息聚合、严格的MLRP、似然比-凸绩效分类、针对监控成本上升的群体评估以及根据Agent的内生逃避倾向评估多任务绩效。我们考察了这些结果对劳动力管理和企业内部组织的影响。
---
英文标题:
《Optimal Incentive Contract with Endogenous Monitoring Technology》
---
作者:
Anqi Li, Ming Yang
---
最新提交年份:
2019
---
分类信息:
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:Theoretical Economics 理论经济学
分类描述:Includes theoretical contributions to Contract Theory, Decision Theory, Game Theory, General Equilibrium, Growth, Learning and Evolution, Macroeconomics, Market and Mechanism Design, and Social Choice.
包括对契约理论、决策理论、博弈论、一般均衡、增长、学习与进化、宏观经济学、市场与机制设计、社会选择的理论贡献。
--
一级分类:Economics 经济学
二级分类:General Economics 一般经济学
分类描述:General methodological, applied, and empirical contributions to economics.
对经济学的一般方法、应用和经验贡献。
--
一级分类:Quantitative Finance 数量金融学
二级分类:Economics 经济学
分类描述:q-fin.EC is an alias for econ.GN. Economics, including micro and macro economics, international economics, theory of the firm, labor economics, and other economic topics outside finance
q-fin.ec是econ.gn的别名。经济学,包括微观和宏观经济学、国际经济学、企业理论、劳动经济学和其他金融以外的经济专题
--
---
英文摘要:
Recent technology advances have enabled firms to flexibly process and analyze sophisticated employee performance data at a reduced and yet significant cost. We develop a theory of optimal incentive contracting where the monitoring technology that governs the above procedure is part of the designer's strategic planning. In otherwise standard principal-agent models with moral hazard, we allow the principal to partition agents' performance data into any finite categories and to pay for the amount of information the output signal carries. Through analysis of the trade-off between giving incentives to agents and saving the monitoring cost, we obtain characterizations of optimal monitoring technologies such as information aggregation, strict MLRP, likelihood ratio-convex performance classification, group evaluation in response to rising monitoring costs, and assessing multiple task performances according to agents' endogenous tendencies to shirk. We examine the implications of these results for workforce management and firms' internal organizations.
---
PDF链接:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1810.11471